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Portfolio choices, firm shocks and uninsurable wage risk⇤
Andreas Fagereng, Luigi Guiso, and Luigi Pistaferri†
Abstract
Assessing the importance of uninsurable wage risk for individual financial choices faces two
challenges. First, the identification of the marginal e↵ect requires a measure of at least one
component of risk that cannot be diversified or avoided. Moreover, measures of uninsurable wage
risk must vary over time to eliminate unobserved heterogeneity. Second, evaluating the economic
significance of risk requires knowledge of the size of all the wage risk actually faced. Existing
estimates are problematic because measures of wage risk fail to satisfy the ”non-avoidability”
requirement. This creates a downward bias which is at the root of the small estimated e↵ect of
wage risk on portfolio choices. To tackle this problem we match panel data of workers and firms
and use the variability in the profitability of the firm that is passed over to workers to obtain a
measure of uninsurable risk. Using this measure to instrument total variability in individual
earnings, we find that the marginal e↵ect of uninsurable wage risk is much larger than estimates
that ignore endogeneity. We bound the economic impact of risk and find that its overall e↵ect is
contained, not because its marginal e↵ect is small but because its size is small. And the size of
uninsurable wage risk is small because firms provide substantial wage insurance.
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1 Introduction
How important is uninsurable wage risk for individuals’ portfolio allocations?1 To answer
this question we assemble a rich administrative household data set from Norway that allows us to
overcome the identification challenges that plague most of the empirical work on the subject.
Starting with Aiyagari (1994), a large literature in macroeconomics and finance has studied
how the presence of wage risk in an incomplete market setting a↵ects the patterns of individual
and aggregate savings, consumption and portfolio allocations over the life cycle, as well as the
behavior of asset prices. The theory argues that under plausible preference restrictions consumers
who face uninsurable wage risk respond by accumulating precautionary savings, raising labor supply,
or more generally changing the pattern of human capital accumulation (e.g., Levhari and Weiss,
1974). Furthermore, people reduce exposure to risks that they can avoid. In particular, they change
the asset allocation of their financial portfolio by lowering the share invested in risky assets, thus
tempering their overall risk exposure (Merton, 1971; Kimball, 1993; Constantinides and Du e, 1996;
Heaton and Lucas, 1996, 2000).
Motivated by these theoretical predictions and the undisputed importance for most households
of labor income, one strand of research has incorporated uninsurable wage risk in calibrated models
of (consumption and) portfolio allocation over the life cycle and explored its ability to reproduce
patterns observed in the data (e.g. Viceira, 2001; Cocco, Gomes, and Maenhout, 2005; Heaton and
Lucas, 2000; Polkovnichenko, 2007). Another strand has tried to assess the empirical relevance of
wage risk in explaining portfolio heterogeneity. A fair characterization of both strands of literature is
that the e↵ect of uninsurable wage risk on portfolio allocation, though carrying the sign that theory
predicts, is relatively small in size. As a consequence, this channel seems to have lost appeal as a
quantitatively important determinant of household portfolio choices or as a candidate explanation
for asset pricing puzzles (such as the equity premium puzzle, see e.g. Cochrane, 2006).
In this paper we re-evaluate the role of uninsurable wage risk for people’s willingness to bear
financial risk and question the conventional wisdom of the empirical literature. We argue that this
literature su↵ers from identification problems that also a↵ect calibrated models of life cycle savings
and portfolio allocation. Identification of the e↵ect of uninsurable wage risk is arduous and its
quantification problematic.
1In the portfolio choice literature the interest is more generally on the e↵ect of ”background” risk, i.e., any risk
that cannot be avoided or insured. In this paper, as in much of the literature, we focus on wage risk because it is the
primary source of uninsurable risk faced by most individuals.
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Identification is arduous for at least three reasons. First, in order to identify the marginal e↵ect
on portfolio choice of uninsurable wage risk one needs exogenous variation in the latter. A popular
solution (Heaton and Lucas, 2000; Angerer, Xiaohong and Pok-Sang Lam, 2009; Betermier et al.,
2011; Palia et al., 2014) is to measure risk with the variance of (residual) log earnings or income
typically obtained from households survey data (e.g., the PSID in the US). Another is to use second
moments from subjective expectations of future incomes (Guiso et al., 1996; Hochguertel, 2003)
or health status (which may be particularly relevant for the elderly, Edwards, 2008). However, as
a recent literature suggests, a substantial part of the residual variation in earnings is predictable
and reflects individual choice rather than risk (e.g., Heckman et al., 2005; Primiceri and van Rens,
2009; Low, Meghir and Pistaferri, 2010; Guvenen and Smith, 2014). As for subjective expectations
data, there are long-standing reservations regarding their validity and content, as well as important
practical data problems: subjective expectations data are rarely available alongside longitudinal data
on assets. The empirical measures described above introduce a sort of errors-in-variable problem
that biases towards zero the estimated e↵ect of risk on portfolio choice. Furthermore, as we shall
discuss, the size of the downward bias can be substantial.
Second, notwithstanding the problem of obtaining a conceptually sound measure of uninsurable
wage risk, other econometric issues may make estimates of its e↵ect on portfolio (or other financial)
choice unreliable. A key issue is that most of the evidence on the e↵ect of wage risk comes from
cross sectional data, inducing unobserved heterogeneity bias. To give a simple example, unobserved
risk aversion may determine both wage risk (through, e.g., occupational choice), as well as the
composition of one’s asset portfolio. Dealing with unobserved heterogeneity is di cult, as one
requires panel data with variation over time in wage risk, which is rare.2
A final issue is that most of the empirical literature uses survey data on assets. These are
notoriously subject to measurement error and rarely sample the upper tail of the distribution (which
is key, given the enormous skewness in the distribution of wealth). Moreover, both in survey and
2Betermier et al. (2011) is one exception. They deal with unobserved heterogeneity by looking at people who
change industry and exploiting di↵erences in income volatility across industries. They find that people who move
from low to high volatility industries reduce exposure to stocks significantly and interpret their finding as consistent
with hedging. While this marks progress, movers solve one issue but raise another: moving is endogenous and it
is conceivable that the same factors that trigger mobility also a↵ect portfolio rebalancing. While the authors show
evidence that movers and stayers share similar observable characteristics, selection on unobservables (such as risk
preferences) may be driving mobility. In addition, the measure of earnings volatility they use – the industry mean
of the volatility of net earnings – reflects both components that qualify as risk and others that do not, as well as
heterogeneity across industries. This makes it hard to estimate the economic e↵ect of wage risk on portfolio choice.
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administrative data there is non-negligible censoring of stockholding because several investors choose
to stay out of the stock market.
One of the contributions of this paper is to develop an identification strategy that overcomes
these problems. First, we isolate a component of labor income variation that truly qualifies as risk -
i.e., one that cannot be avoided or insured. This is the component of the wage that fluctuates with
idiosyncratic variation in firm performance, reflecting transmission of firm shocks onto wages. We
show that this component can be used as an instrument for total residual labor income variation -
which allows to deal with measurement error in wage risk. Because this component varies over time,
availability of long panel data on firms and their workers makes it possible to deal with unobserved
heterogeneity, thus circumventing the second obstacle to achieve reliable identification.
We use administrative data for Norway. Since Norway levies a tax on wealth, each year Norwegian
taxpayers must report their assets, item by item, to the tax authority. Asset holding information
is provided by third parties, implying virtually no measurement error. Moreover, the data are
available for a long time span and cover the entire population, including those in the very top tail
of the wealth distribution. We use these data to compute financial portfolio shares at the household
level. In addition, we merge the tax records data on wealth with matched employer/employees data
from the social security archives. The latter contain information on workers’ employment spells and
earnings in each job, as well as measures of firm performance.
Additionally, we use firm employment turnover and firm closure due to bankruptcy to construct
measures of unemployment risk that complement the measure of wage risk described above.
We document a number of important findings. First, ignoring the endogeneity of wage variability
but accounting for unobserved heterogeneity, we reproduce the small marginal e↵ect of uninsurable
wage risk on the portfolio allocation to risky assets that characterizes the empirical literature.
However, when we instrument wage variability with the firm-variation component of wage risk, we
find that the marginal e↵ect is an order of magnitude larger. This suggests a large downward bias
in prevailing estimates of the e↵ect of uninsurable wage risk and resurrects the importance – at the
margin – of wage risk for portfolio choice and asset pricing. In contrast, we find very small e↵ects
of unemployment risk, possibly because this type of risk is substantially insured through generous
social insurance programs in Norway.3
3Empirical estimates of the e↵ect of uninsurable wage risk on portfolio allocations face also a problem of censoring
(a large fraction of investors hold no risky assets in their portfolio). Simultaneously accounting for censoring, fixed
unobserved heterogeneity, and endogeneity due to measurement error is computationally unfeasible. The very few
estimators that have been proposed in the literature are based on very strong assumptions that are unlikely to hold in
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Second, we find that the marginal e↵ect of uninsurable wage risk varies considerably across
individuals depending on their level of wealth. The portfolio response of individuals at the bottom
of the wealth distribution - those with little bu↵ers to self-insure against risk - is twice as large
as that of the workers with median wealth; the e↵ect gets smaller as wealth increases and drops
to zero at the top of the wealth distribution. Uninsurable wage risk is irrelevant for those with
large amounts of assets despite the fact that their compensation is more sensitive (as we document)
to firm shocks. As far as we know, we are the first to document empirically the importance of
wealth bu↵ers for the e↵ect of wage risk on portfolio choice. This helps understanding what wage
risk matters for. Because low-wealth individuals are sensitive to income risk, the latter matters for
explaining portfolio heterogeneity among low-wealth investors. But because the portfolio of high
wealth individuals is insensitive to income risk and because they hold the bulk of the stock market,
income risk is unlikely to impact stock prices.
Finally, in assessing the economic importance of uninsurable wage risk for financial decisions one
needs to separate motive - i.e., size of marginal e↵ect - from scope -the size of risk itself. A full
assessment of the latter would require identifying how much of the non-firm-related variation in
wages is truly risk and how much is acted upon by the agent. This is hard to do in the absence of a
formal model that sets out the sources of market incompleteness as well as workers’ information set
and corresponding economic choices. However, using the estimated parameters for the marginal e↵ect
of wage risk on the portfolio allocation, the estimated degree of firm-provided wage insurance, and
a sensible estimate of the degree of predictability of workers’ wage shocks obtained as a by-product
of our tests, we can assess the contribution of actual wage risk to portfolio allocation. Evaluated at
the sample means of these values, the e↵ect of uninsurable wage risk is small: individuals with the
average amount of wage risk have a share of risky assets in portfolio that is 1/4 of a percentage
point lower than that of those facing no wage risk whatsoever. While this conclusion is similar to
that of the existing literature, the economic interpretation is very di↵erent. Most papers in the
literature find that the scope (the size of wage risk) is large but the motive (the causal e↵ect of
risk on portfolio choice) is small. We argue the opposite: the motive is strong - a conclusion based
our specific application. Nevertheless, assuming the various biases due to unobserved heterogeneity, endogeneity of
wage variance and censoring are (approximately) linear, we can gauge their sizes and obtain a back-of-the-envelope
estimate of the marginal e↵ect of uninsurable wage risk on the financial portfolio. When we do this (see Section 6.1)
we still find an estimate that is an order on magnitude larger than the OLS (fixed e↵ect) estimate, implying that the
key force biasing the e↵ect of uninsurable wage risk is measurement error (i.e., the assumption that all residual wage
variability is risk).
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on our ability to isolate plausible exogenous variation in wage risk. The scope is limited primarily
because firms provide workers with substantial insurance, containing considerably the size of wage
risk. Because we identify separately the marginal e↵ect of a change in background risk, the amount
of insurance firms provide, and the degree of predictability of workers’ wage shocks, we can run
counterfactuals by altering these parameters. If firms were to provide more high-powered wage
contracts (a tendency documented by Benabou and Tirole, 2015) and start sharing shocks equally
with their workers, the latter would reduce the demand for risky financial assets substantially,
particularly low wealth workers. Equally sized changes in the degree of wage predictability would
instead have a small impact on the amount of wage risk and thus on the portfolio allocation. In
sum, the economic importance of uninsurable wage risk crucially hinges on the insurance role of the
firm and the amount of assets available to the individual to bu↵er labor income shocks.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the empirical literature and highlights
our contribution. In Section 3 we illustrate the econometric problems that arise when trying to
identify the e↵ect of uninsurable wage risk on financial decisions, and show how we tackle them.
Section 4 describes the data sources. Section 5 discusses the construction of our measures of wage
risk. Section 6 turns to the estimates of the marginal e↵ect of uninsurable wage risk on people’s
portfolio allocation, presents several robustness tests and allows for wealth-driven heterogeneity in
the portfolio response to wage risk. We discuss the economic e↵ect of wage risk on the demand for
risky financial assets in Section 7. Section 8 concludes.
2 Literature Review
Several papers provide evidence that uninsurable wage risk has a tempering e↵ect on households
portfolio allocation. In one of the first studies on the topic, Guiso et al. (1996) use a measure
of risk obtained from the subjective distribution of future labor income in a sample of Italian
workers and find that households with more spread-out beliefs of future income invest a lower share
in risky assets. However, the economic e↵ect is small: households with above average subjective
earnings variance invest a 2 percentage points lower share of their wealth in stocks than households
with below average uncertainty. Because they use cross sectional data, unobserved heterogeneity
cannot be controlled for.4 Hochguertel (2003) also relies on a self-assessed subjective measure of
4Also using cross sectional data, Arrondel and Calvo-Pardo (2012) find a positive correlation between subjective
income risk and the portfolio risky share of French households. They argue that the result can be explained by sample
selection of more risk tolerant workers into riskier occupations.
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earnings risk available for Dutch households. The data are longitudinal, allowing him to control for
unobserved heterogeneity. However, the results are similar: a negative, small e↵ect of subjective
wage income risk on the share of risky assets.
One advantage of subjective expectations is that in principle they reflect all the information
available to the household; one issue, however, is that elicitation can be problematic as households
may have di culties understanding the survey question. This may result in classical measurement
error as well as in households mis-reporting the probability of very low income states. Both facts are
consistent with the low estimated variances of income growth compared to those obtained from panel
data estimates of labor income processes. Accordingly, several papers have measured uninsurable
wage risk using panel data models of workers’ earnings.
Heaton and Lucas (2000) use income data from tax records of a sample of US workers to measure
wage income and business income variability and correlate them with stock portfolio shares. They
find a negative, but small and statistically insignificant e↵ect of wage income variability and a
negative, statistically significant but still small e↵ect of business income variability on the demand
for stocks. Unfortunately, inference is impaired both because portfolio data are imputed as well as
because their measures of risk - the unconditional standard deviation of wage income and proprietary
income growth - may, as we discuss in the next section, contain a large portion that reflects choice
rather that risk. In addition, unobserved heterogeneity, particularly in the case of proprietary
income, may be driving the results.
Angerer et al. (2009) overcome some of these problems. They use the US National Longitudinal
Survey of Youth to estimate the residual variance of labor income growth, after conditioning on
a number of observables. Thus, their measure of uninsurable wage risk reduces the weight of the
predicable component and in addition they distinguish between transitory and permanent shocks to
labor income. Perhaps because of this, compared to the previous papers they find somewhat larger
e↵ects, particularly in response to the variance of permanent shocks to labor income. Overall, a
10% increase in the standard deviation of labor income shocks lowers the portfolio stock share by
3.3 percentage points. More recently, Palia et al. (2014) have extended the analysis to consider
several sources of risk, including labor income, returns on housing, and entrepreneurial income.
They estimate that one standard deviation increase in wage risk lowers the share in stocks by 1.8
percentage points and find a larger e↵ect on participation (a reduction of 5.5 percentage points).
Needless to say, e↵ects are larger when all sources of risk increase at once. Yet, because they
compute uninsurable wage risk as the standard deviation of the (unconditional) growth rate of
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earnings, their measure likely overstates the true amount of risk people face.
Overall, this summary of the literature suggests relatively contained e↵ects of uninsurable wage
risk on the demand for risky assets. This channel has therefore been dismissed as an important
factor in explaining portfolio allocation heterogeneity and assets prices (Heaton and Lucas, 2008;
Cochrane, 2006). Yet, the likely presence of (potentially severe) measurement error in risk raises
some doubts about this conclusion and thus on the assets prices implications. In the next section we
set up an econometric framework and argue that empirical measures of uninsurable wage risk such
as those used in the literature so far are very likely to generate substantial downward biases in the
marginal e↵ect of uninsurable wage risk (and other sources of background risk). We also suggests a
methodology to obtain a well-defined measure of uninsurable wage risk and a consistent estimate of
its marginal causal e↵ect.
3 Econometric Framework
Consider the following empirical model for the portfolio share in risky assets:
Sit =W
0
it  +  Bit + ri + "it (1)
where Sit is the share of risky assets in individual i’s financial portfolio at time t, Wit are time-
varying socio-demographic characteristics related to portfolio choice (such as age and total wealth),
Bit a measure of uninsurable background risk, ri an unobserved individual fixed e↵ect (which may
capture heterogeneity in risk tolerance, financial and general education, or other persistent traits
shifting the demand for risky assets), and "it an error term. Theory predicts   < 0, i.e., people
respond to more unavoidable risk by reducing the amount invested in risky assets. The empirical
literature has used variants of the above model, coupled with some strategy to measure risk. Success
in identifying the parameter   rides on the ability to account for the unobserved heterogeneity ri
and, as we show below, on the properties of measured uninsurable risk.
For most individuals, the key component of uninsurable risk originates from wage fluctuations.
Thus, most papers assume that only source of background risk is wage risk. A general empirical
strategy for measuring uninsurable wage risk consists of writing a labor earnings process such as:
ln yijt = Z
0
it  + vit + ✓ffjt (2)
where yijt are earnings paid to worker i by firm j at time t, Zit is a vector of observable wage
8
determinants, vit a component of worker’s earnings volatility that is partly under the control of the
agent and unrelated to the fortunes of the firm (e.g., unobserved changes in general human capital),
and fjt a firm-specific shock. The econometrician does not observe the degree of the agent’s control
over vit. We assume that the error components fjt and vit are mutually uncorrelated.5 In keeping
with the evidence below, we assume that firm shocks are passed onto wages with pass-through
coe cient ✓f . We can decompose the evolution of the unobserved component of wages into two
components - one that is avoidable or insurable (Ait), and one that is not (Uit). Hence:
ln yijt   Z0it  = (1  ✓v) vit| {z }
Avoidable
+ ✓vvit + ✓ffjt| {z }
Unavoidable
= Ait + Uit
The separation of vit in a component that is avoidable and one that is not (with weight ✓v)
comes from recognizing that part of what the econometrician identifies as “risk” is variability in
earnings that reflects, at least in part, individual choices rather than risk. For instance, time out of
the labor market (inducing large swings in earnings across years) could be time invested voluntarily
in human capital accumulation. Some volatility can be generated by people choosing to work longer
hours, or perhaps to invest in training program that increase their future productivity, in response
to adverse financial market shocks a↵ecting the value of their portfolio. A recent literature suggests
that a non-negligible fraction of year-to-year fluctuations in labor earnings reflect heterogeneity or
choice, rather than risk (see Heckman et al., 2005; Primiceri and van Rens, 2009; Low, Meghir and
Pistaferri, 2010; and Guvenen and Smith, 2014).6
In keeping with this discussion, the ”true” measure of uninsurable wage risk should be:
Bit = var (Uit)
= ✓2vvar (vit) + ✓
2
fvar (fjt)
= ⇢vVit + ⇢fFit (3)
where V and F are the worker-related and firm-related uninsurable risk components.
Unfortunately, this is not what is typically used in the empirical literature. First, since in survey
data wages are measured with error ⇠it, the observed wage is:
5Note that in most of the literature there is no information on the firm, so these two terms are conflated.
6A predictable variation in earnings (e.g., a temporary reduction in hours of work due to a slowdown in demand) is
not necessarily avoidable or insurable. However, the idea is that information about such event gives the ability to at
least partially self-insure against it.
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ln y⇤ijt = ln yijt + ⇠ijt
Second, the measure of wage risk that is typically used is the overall unexplained variation in
wages, i.e.,
 2it = var
 
ln y⇤ijt   Z0it 
 
= Vit + ⇢fFit +  
2
⇠ = Bit + 'it (4)
where 'it = (1  ⇢v)Vit +  2⇠ . This di↵ers from the true one because it includes the variance of the
measurement error and because it assumes that the volatility of the worker component vit is all
unavoidable risk, while in fact a fraction (1  ⇢v) of it reflects choice-related variation.
An OLS regression of Sit on the measure  2it (omitting individual fixed e↵ects, ri) gives inconsistent
estimates of the sensitivity of portfolio choice to wage risk.7 Indeed:
p lim b OLS =   ⇢vvar (Vit) + ⇢2fvar (Fit)
var (Vit) + ⇢2fvar (Fit) + var
⇣
 2⇠
⌘ + cov (ri, Vit + ⇢fFit)
var (Vit) + ⇢2fvar (Fit) + var
⇣
 2⇠
⌘
The first term is a measurement error bias: wage risk is mis-measured both because all variability
in vit is interpreted as risk, and because there is unaccounted noise that agents don’t act upon.
Furthermore, if higher risk tolerance is the only element of unobserved heterogeneity and it is
associated to both less conservative portfolios and a more volatile wage process,8 then the second
term is positive and may well exacerbate the ”measurement error/conceptual risk” bias towards
zero (and even produce a positive b OLS estimate if it is large enough).9
7Conditional onWit.
8Consider for example using occupation dummies to measure variation in wages, and hence risk. Empirically, the
self-employed have greater year-to-year wage volatility, while public employees face lower wage and employment risk.
If allocation to occupations were random, theory would predict that the high risk types should hold more conservative
portfolios than the low risk types. But this is not what is typically found in the data. The self-employed invest more
in stocks and have greater income volatility (see, e.g., Georgarakos and Inderst, 2014). The “puzzle” can be explained
by the fact that there is sorting into occupations based on attitudes towards risk which confounds the impact of wage
risk on portfolio choice because more risk averse individuals choose both low risk occupations and more conservative
portfolios. A similar reasoning (although producing a bias of opposite sign) applies to having traits that lead to
persistently high probability of unemployment. Individuals with these traits will likely invest less in risky assets and
also experience more year-to-year earnings volatility.
9In other words, suppose that the true   is  0.5. If ⇢vvar(Vit)+⇢
2
fvar(Fit)
var(Vit)+⇢
2
fvar(Fit)+var
⇣
 2⇠
⌘ = 0.8, then in the absence of
unobserved heterogeneity bias, p lim b OLS =  0.4. However, if cov(ri,Vit+⇢fFit)
var(Vit)+⇢
2
fvar(Fit)+var
⇣
 2⇠
⌘ = 0.3, for example, then
p lim b OLS =  0.1, which exacerbates the bias even further towards zero.
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In panel data one can control for individual fixed e↵ects. Hence, the second bias term disappears.
However, the sensitivity of portfolio choice to risk remains downward biased, i.e.:
p lim b FE =   ⇢vvar
⇣eVit⌘+ ⇢2fvar ⇣ eFit⌘
var
⇣eVit⌘+ ⇢2fvar ⇣ eFit⌘+ var ⇣e 2⇠⌘ (5)
where eX denotes a variable expressed in deviation from the individual mean as to remove fixed
e↵ects. The extent of the downward bias can be substantial. Even ignoring measurement error in
earnings, if firms o↵er substantial wage insurance (i.e., the term ⇢f is ”small”) and if a relevant
share of workers related variation in earnings is due to choice rather than to risk (i.e., ⇢v is small),
then the FE estimate of the e↵ect of wage risk can be much lower than the true e↵ect.
Both conditions are likely to hold in practice. As documented by Guiso et al. (2005) using Italian
data, firms o↵er partial but substantial wage insurance, implying a value of ⇢f much smaller than 1
and close to 0.01 (since their estimate of ✓f is 0.1). In Section 5 we show that this result holds also
in our Norwegian data. Additionally, there is evidence that a lot of variation in individual earnings
is predictable. For instance, Cunha and Heckman (2007) estimate that for US skilled workers only
8% of the increase in wage variability is due to increased uncertainty and 92% to heterogeneity.
Using Italian subjective earnings expectations data (which incorporate more information than that
typically available to the econometrician), Kaufman and Pistaferri (2009) calculate that only about
1/4 of the residual earnings growth variance is risk, while the remainder is predictable variation or
noise.
We take these concerns seriously and recognize that the very notion of uninsurable wage risk
requires that it is exogenous and that agents have little control over it. We use firm-derived measures
of wage (and employment) risk to isolate one exogenous component of the variance of individual
returns to human capital and use this as an instrument for the total variance of (residual) earnings
 2it. In the above framework, this boils down to using Fit as an instrument for  
2
it (while controlling
for fixed e↵ects in the risky asset share equation). Why is Fit a valid instrument? First, under the
assumption that the firm only o↵ers partial wage insurance to the workers (an assumption strongly
supported by the evidence in Section 5), Fit has predictive power for  2it (as can be seen from (4)
when ⇢F 6= 0). Second, once occupational sorting (or other persistent labor market traits that
induce both wage volatility and shift portfolio choice) is neutralized by controlling for individual
fixed e↵ects, Fit is orthogonal to the residual in the portfolio allocation decision as it only reflects
variability in the productivity of the firm.
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It is easy to show that this strategy identifies the e↵ect of background risk on portfolio choice
as:10
p lim b IV FE = p lim cov
⇣eSit, eFit⌘
cov
⇣e 2it, eFit⌘
= p lim
cov
⇣
 
⇣
⇢v eVit + ⇢f eFit⌘+ e"it, eFit⌘
cov
⇣eVit + ⇢f eFit + e 2⇠ , eFit⌘
=   (6)
It is important to notice that the reduced form estimate of firm volatility onto the share of risky
assets does not identify the sensitivity of the portfolio allocation to wage risk, but instead:
p lim b RFFE = p lim cov
⇣eSit, eFit⌘
var
⇣ eFit⌘
= p lim
cov
⇣
 
⇣
⇢v eVit + ⇢f eFit⌘+ e"it, eFit⌘
var
⇣ eFit⌘
=  ⇢f   
as firm shocks pass through only partially to wages. Furthermore, the di↵erence between the true
sensitivity   and the reduced form response  ⇢f can be very large if firms provide substantial wage
insurance, i.e., ⇢f is ”small”. We stress this case because Hung et al. (2014) propose precisely this
type of exercise, assigning to individual investors the stock market volatility of the firm they work for
as a measure of uninsurable wage risk and estimating the portfolio response to this measure. This
strategy, while similar in spirit to ours, ignores that the firm component enters with a pass-through
coe cient ⇢f < 1. To be able to identify   from the reduced form estimate one needs also to
separately identify ⇢f . This point is missed by Hung et al. (2014), and their strategy would only
deliver consistent estimates of   if the worker ”owned the firm” - i.e. in the absence of wage
insurance. On the other hand, papers that use survey data sets such as the SCF or PSID to estimate
the e↵ect of background risk on portfolio choices, cannot identify its e↵ect as they lack matched
employer-employee data to estimate Fit and ⇢f.
10Note that a simple cross-sectional IV estimator (which ignores fixed e↵ects) will still be inconsistent, as p lim b IV =
 + p lim cov(ri,Fit)
cov( 2it,Fit)
.
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It is important to stress that we are not assuming that uninsurable risk comes only from firm-
related shocks. Our exercise is simply trying to isolate a source of variation in total wage variance
that is plausibly exogenous. This is all we need for the identification of the marginal e↵ect of risk
on portfolio choice. There are certainly additional sources of risk that are also exogenous, such as
those associated with skill depreciation, poor health, etc., and that are independent of the firm’s
fortunes. However, these are much harder to identify in our administrative data. To quantify the
e↵ect of overall risk exposure on portfolio behavior one needs a credible estimate of the marginal
e↵ect of uninsurable risk on portfolio choice (which we have), as well as a measure of the overall
level of risk. In Section 7 we propose a bounding exercise in the attempt to quantify the e↵ect of
overall risk exposure on portfolio choice.
The last econometric issue we need to address is the fact that the dependent variable is censored:
a non-negligible fraction of households have no risky assets in their financial portfolio. One way to
handle this issue is to assume that equation (1) represents the latent demand for risky assets, but
what is observed is a censored version of it:
Scit = Sit ⇥ 1 {Sit   0}
Using a fixed e↵ect-IV estimator when the dependent variable is censored implies that (6) no
longer provides a consistent estimator. In principle, one could apply an estimator that deals with
all three problems at once (fixed e↵ects, endogenous regressors, and censoring of the dependent
variable), such as the extension of the standard Tobit estimator considered by Honore` and Hu
(2004). In practice, this estimator does not work well in our administrative large-scale data set. We
will instead consider some back-of-the-envelope exercises that compare various estimators proposed
in the literature to gain some knowledge about the true value of the parameter of interest  .
In general, the data requirement for identifying the e↵ect of uninsurable wage risk are formidable.
Matched employee-employer data are needed to obtain a proper measure of (at least one component
of) uninsurable wage risk; to account for individual fixed e↵ects the data need to have a panel
dimension, and the panel needs to be long enough to generate variation over time in wage risk.
Finally, inference on portfolio decisions is greatly facilitated if assets and incomes are measured
without error, a requirement that is rarely met in households surveys because measured incomes
and financial assets are plagued with reporting error, under-reporting and non-reporting (e.g. Hurst,
Li and Pugsley, 2015).
In the empirical analysis we use administrative data on wages and financial assets, where
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measurement error is virtually absent. These data are available for over 15 years and we can
identify the employer: hence we are able to construct a measure of Fit that is individual-and
time-varying. Because the data is a panel we can control for individual fixed e↵ects and thus purge
the estimates from unobserved heterogeneity correlated with measures of uninsurable wage risk while
simultaneously driving portfolio choice (e.g. risk tolerance). Since we are able to simultaneously
account for all the issues that plague existing empirical studies, we are giving the background risk
model the best possible chance to succeed or fail and understand why it fails or succeeds.
4 Data and Norwegian institutional insurance provisions
4.1 Data
To study whether households shelter against uninsurable wage risk by changing their risky
financial portfolio, we employ high-quality data from Norway consisting of eight separate databases.
All of our data are collected for administrative purposes, which substantially reduce concerns
about measurement error. The data sets can be linked through unique identifiers assigned to each
individual and firm in Norway (similar to SSN’s and EIN’s for the US, respectively). Here we
provide a broad description of these data sets, which unless otherwise specified cover the time period
1995-2010; Appendix A1 illustrates the features of the data in greater detail.
The Central Population Register contains basic end-of-year demographic information (i.e.,
gender, birth date, county of residence, and marital status) on all registered Norwegian residents.
Importantly, it contains family identifiers allowing us to match spouses and cohabiting couples who
have a common child. We merge this data set with information on educational attainment (from
the National Educational Database) and information on end-of-year financial assets from tax
records (Administrative Tax and Income Register).
To comply with the wealth tax, each year Norwegians must report to the tax authority the value
of all real and financial assets holdings as of the end of the previous calendar year. Data on traded
financial assets, for a broad spectrum of assets categories, are reported (at their market value)
directly by the financial institution that has the assets in custody (e.g., a mutual fund or a deposit
bank). This has two main advantages: first, financial assets are measured with virtually no error;
second, because they are reported by a third party, the scope for tax evasion is absent. For stocks
of non-listed and non-traded companies, asset valuation is based on annual reports submitted to
the tax authority by the companies themselves. If the tax authority finds the proposed evaluation
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unrealistically low, it can start a formal audit process, which limits the scope for undervaluation.
Besides the asset values data set, we have also access to the Register of Shareholders for
the period 2004 to 2010. This register reports, on an individual basis, the number and value of
individual stockholdings, together with the ID of the firm that issues the stock. This allows us to
account for direct stockholding in the company where the worker is employed, a feature that turns
out to be useful when we discuss various robustness checks (Section 6.2).
Because we focus on the household as our decision unit, we aggregate assets holdings at the
level of the family by summing up asset values across family members using the unique household
ID described above.11 We then classify financial assets holdings into ”risky assets” (R) - the
sum of directly held stocks in listed and non-listed companies and mutual funds with a stock
component - and ”risk-free assets” (RF ) - the di↵erence between total financial assets and risky
assets, which includes bank deposits, government bonds and money market funds - and define the
portfolio risky assets share for each households Sit =
Rit
Rit+RFit
. Because of limited stock market
participation, Sit = 0 for non-participants, giving rise to censoring in our left-hand side variable.12
In the population (before any sample selection), participation in the risky assets market increases
substantially in the 1995-2010 period (see Figure 1). During the same time period the the average
portfolio share in risky assets also increases (the dashed line in Figure 1).
Consistent with what found in the literature (Guiso and Sodini, 2013), there is substantial cross
sectional variation in the conditional risky share. As Figure 2 shows, its distribution spans the
entire [0-1] range – from people holding very small amounts to people investing their entire financial
portfolio in stocks. In this paper we ask how much of this heterogeneity can be explained by wage
and unemployment risk, if any.
Table 1 shows summary statistics for the portfolio data and the financial wealth of our Norwegian
sample. Since we select younger households with the primary earner working in the private sector
(see below), their average stock market participation is higher than in the whole population (55
percent); conditional on participation, the average Norwegian household in our sample invests about
38% of its portfolio in risky assets.
The Employer-Employee Register links workers to firms; for each worker it reports all
employment spells with each employer, and the compensation received. This allows us to trace the
11In Norway married couples are taxed jointly when it comes to wealth tax, but individually for income tax purposes.
12In the original data, there are households holding extremely small amounts in stock accounts, due presumably to
dormant accounts. We assume that genuine stock market participants have at least the equivalent of $30 worth of
risky assets in their portfolio. Imposing di↵erent thresholds has no e↵ects on the results (see Table 5).
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working history of each worker as she moves across firms and occupational status.
We combine the Employer-Employee Register with the Central Register of Establishments
and Enterprises and the Balance Sheet Register with the unique firm ID present in all of
these data sets. The former contains information on industry classification and institutional sector,
whereas the other contains accounting data on the firm’s assets, liabilities and income statement.
Among other items, it includes data on the firm’s value added and sales that we use to construct
(statistically) shocks to the firm profitability.
Lastly, on the firm side the Register of Bankruptcies contains information on the date a firm
enters a bankruptcy proceeding (if any) and is declared insolvent. We use this data set to identify
episodes of firm closure and enrich the measure of background risk based on the variance of workers
earnings with a measure of employment risk. In fact, the total variance of income comes partly from
(high frequency) wage variability conditional on working, and partly from (low frequency) income
variability conditional on losing the job.
Combining these three firm level data sets with the Employer-Employee Register allows us to
assign each worker in the sample the variability of the firm he/she works for (which depends on
the pass-through coe cient estimated in Section 5), and to obtain a measure of wage risk that is
theoretically more appropriate. Similarly, we can assign each worker the risk of involuntary job loss
at that firm. Because our measure of risk depends on shocks to the firm that are in some degree
passed over to workers, we focus on a sample of individuals who are continuously employed in the
private sector (30% of the workers are employed in the public sector in Norway).13 This excludes
those those who have a spell in the government sector, the retired/disabled, and those earning
less than the threshold amount for unemployment benefits (the “unemployed”). We also exclude
individuals who are younger than 25 (and hence possibly still in college) and those older than 60
(who may have intermittent participation and widespread access to early retirement, Vestad 2014).
After these exclusions and a few others due to missing data at the firm level, we are left with a final
sample of 4,846,766 observations. The number of observations in the various regressions we run are
less than this because we use lags for constructing some of the variables and instruments. Appendix
A2 describes the sample selection in greater detail.
13If there are multiple earners in the household (and both work in the private sector) we measure wage risk with
the one faced by the primary earner.
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4.2 Employment and wage insurance in Norway
Portfolio (and savings) responses to wage fluctuations and risk of job loss can be a↵ected by the
extent of insurance that Norwegian workers obtain through the welfare state. For example, no
matter how large the volatility of wages, portfolio choice would be independent of it if wage risk
were fully insured.
Here we provide a broad description of social insurance programs in Norway, which are indeed
relatively generous by international standards. First, workers receive unemployment insurance (UI).
For permanent layo↵s UI lasts for 52-104 weeks and replaces, on average, 62% of the gross income
in the last occupation (up to a cap). For temporary layo↵s, UI is limited to 26 weeks within a 1.5
year period since layo↵. Norway o↵ers also disability insurance, which is obtained when the assessed
loss in earnings capacity is at least 50%. Unlike the US, eligibility is means-tested (based on income
and assets). Finally, individuals may have access to sickness and maternity benefits and active labor
market programs to revamp their skills in case of displacement.
While Norwegian workers are better shielded than, say, US workers against extreme low real-
izations of their human capital (i.e., their consumption floor is higher), they do face substantial
uninsured risk. First, while unemployment insurance is generous (at least relative to US standards),
unemployment risk is not fully insured: UI benefits are time limited, replace a fraction of lost
wages, and remaining unemployed is economically costly due to scarring e↵ects (Nielsen and Reiso,
2011). Indeed, despite the institutional di↵erences, in the 2001-2013 period average duration of
unemployment in Norway was only 15% longer than in the US for people aged 25-54.14 Second, there
is little government protection against the risk of wage fluctuations conditional on employment –
especially those induced by firm-related shocks. There is indeed no insurance against wage cuts or not
receiving bonuses, but there is against being laid o↵. Finally, while severe wage fluctuations induced
by, say, health limitations are insured through the disability insurance system, the means-tested
aspect of the program reduces the scope of insurance, in particular due to the relative low risk of a
disability and the fungibility of savings (for example due to retirement or bequest motives).
5 Measuring Risk
In this and following sections we discuss our empirical findings. We start by motivating
economically our instruments. Next, we estimate the marginal e↵ect of uninsurable wage risk on
14See OECD statistics at http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DatasetCode=AVD DUR.
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portfolio allocation. Finally, we assess the robustness of our findings.
To construct a measure of wage risk that can be arguably considered as unavoidable or uninsurable,
we focus on shocks to firm profitability, which may induce variation in workers’ pay (conditional on
retaining the job) or even involuntary job loss in more extreme cases. This strategy requires that:
a) we measure firm-related shocks; and b) we identify how much of these shocks are passed onto the
worker’s wages.
In principle, our instrument would be economically irrelevant if labor markets were frictionless
and workers could move rapidly and without cost between firms. A frictionless labor market would,
e↵ectively, provide them with full insurance against firm idiosyncratic shocks. The fact that firm
shocks are passed onto wages (as we document below) is of course prima facie evidence against this
possibility.
The idea that firm-specific shocks are passed onto workers’ earnings requires that wages are
at least partly determined at the firm level. This in turn depends on the wage setting process.
In Norway, like in other Nordic countries, union density and coverage are high. However, in the
private sector the coverage of collective bargaining agreements is actually “only” 55%, leaving ample
room for many workers to have wages set outside the conventional framework. Even for workers
whose wages are negotiated centrally, there is still ample room for local negotiation (or wage drift).
Moreover, for white collars, collective bargaining only determines the procedures for setting wages,
while the actual level of wages is negotiated on an individual basis. Finally, as reported by Loken
and Stokke (2009), the share of private sector employees with a component of pay that is variable
(and most likely related to the firm performance) has increased considerably from 10% in 1990 to
40% in 2005.
5.1 Wage risk: firm shocks and pass-through
Following Guiso, Pistaferri and Schivardi (2005), we measure firm j performance with its value
added, V Ajt,15 and assume its log evolves according to the process:
lnV Ajt = X
0
jt'+Qjt + f
T
jt
Qjt = Qjt 1 + fPjt
15Firm value added is defined as revenues minus operating costs other than labor and capital costs (i.e., materials
and services, such as rents, advertisement, and R&D). This is a standard measure of firm productivity or performance
that captures the total economic value created (added) by the joint use of capital and labor employed within the firm.
18
where Xjt is a vector of observables that captures the predictable component of firm’s performance.
The shock component is the residual Qjt + fTjt, the sum of a random walk component Qjt with
permanent shock fPjt and a transitory shock component f
T
jt.
Next, we model the earnings yijt (in logs) of worker i in firm j, in a similar vein, as a linear
function of a predictable component that depends on a vector of workers observed characteristics,
Zijt, an individual random walk and transitory component, and a component that depends on the
firm shocks with transmission coe cients ✓T and ✓P , respectively for transitory and permanent firm
value added stochastic component.16 Hence we generalize (2) and write:
ln yijt = Z
0
ijt +vit + ✓
PQjt + ✓
T fTjt
vit = Pit + ⌘it
Pit = Pit 1 +  it
For firm-related uninsurable wage risk to matter, ✓T and ✓P must be positive and significant.
That is, firms must pass over to the workers some of the shocks to their performance and not o↵er
them full wage insurance. Using Italian data, Guiso et al. (2005) show that firms o↵er partial wage
insurance with respect to permanent and transitory shocks - that is the estimated values of ✓T and
✓P are positive but smaller than one - and that the pass-through is larger for permanent shocks.
Replicating their methodology, their result has been shown to hold also in other countries, such as
Portugal (Cardoso and Portela, 2009), Germany (Guertzgen, 2010), Hungary (Katay, 2008), Sweden
(Friedrich et al., 2015), Belgium (Fuss and Wintr, 2008), France (Biscourp et al., 2005), and the US
(Lagakos and Ordonez, 2011, Juhn et al., 2015) with remarkably similar patterns.
To establish the degree of pass-through of firm shocks to wages in Norway we use Guiso et
al. (2005)’s methodology. Define the unexplained growth of firm value added, gjt, and of workers’
earnings, !ijt as :
gjt =  (lnV Ajt  X0jt')
!ijt =  (ln yijt   Z0ijt )
16These processes fit the data quite well. The first order autocovariances in the residual of the wage equation and
in the firms value added equation are negative, economically large and highly statistically significant. The higher
order autocovariances decay very rapidly (the second order autocovariance is 10 times smaller than the first order one
in both processes). Not surprising given the very large number of observations, they retain statistical significance.
Economically, however, autocovariances past the second lag are minuscule.
19
Guiso et al. (2005) show that the pass-through coe cients ✓T and ✓P can be identified by simple
IV regressions:
✓T =
cov(!ijt, gjt+1)
cov(gjt, gjt+1)
✓P =
cov(!ijt, gjt 1 + gjt + gjt+1)
cov(gjt, gjt 1 + gjt + gjt+1)
Accordingly, we preliminarily run regressions for firm value added and workers’ wages. In the
first we control for year dummies, area dummies, sector dummies, log firm size, and in the second
for year dummies, a quadratic in age, dummies for the quantity and type of schooling, firm size,
dummies for whether the individual experienced periods out of work due to sickness, maternity
leave, or unemployment, family size, area dummies, dummies for immigration status, and for family
type. We then retrieve the residuals from these regressions (the empirical analogs of gjt and !ijt
above), and estimate ✓T and ✓P . Results for the pass-through estimates are shown in Table 2.17
Both parameters ✓T and ✓P are positive and estimated with great precision, implying that both
permanent and transitory shocks to the firm value added are passed onto wages. As in Guiso et
al. (2005), the wage response to permanent shocks to the firm performance (0.071) is significantly
larger than the response to transitory shocks (0.018), which accords with intuition. The value of the
F -test suggests that the instruments used to identify the two parameters are quite powerful while
the Hansen J-test of the overidentifying restrictions reveals some misspecification for ✓T , possibly
arising from the fact that the i.i.d. assumption is a bit restrictive. Given that transitory shocks
play a small role, this is not worrying.
To have a reasonably long series of wage volatility measures, our strategy is to compute the
overall variance of unexplained workers earnings growth over T periods using rolling averages:18
17If workers respond to a negative firm permanent shock by working permanently more, then our estimate of ✓P is
downward biased (there is actually less insurance than we estimate). How large is the bias? This type of reaction
requires that workers have high Marshallian elasticities, but for men these are typically very small, so we conjecture
that the bias is not very large. We also suspect that not many workers can work longer hours when the firm is
distressed (conditional on staying).
18This measure can be interpreted as an approximation to a conditional variance prediction one would get from
estimating an ARCH(T ) process (with restrictions on the ARCH coe cients). Meghir and Pistaferri (2004) find
evidence that wage risk can be modeled as an ARCH process. The assumption is that individuals form forecasts about
risk using recent realizations of the process (squared) innovations.
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 2it =
PT 1
s=0 !
2
ijt s
T
(7)
We use this measure as explanatory variable when estimating the risky portfolio share but
instrument it with the variances of the unexplained firm value added growth - both permanent and
transitory - computed over the same T periods:
FPjt =
PT 1
s=0 gjt s(gjt s 1 + gjt s + gjt s+1)
T
(8)
F Tjt =
PT 1
s=0 gjt sgjt s+1
T
(9)
Notice that since the computation of these variances requires using lagged values of growth rates,
it can only be implemented if the panel has a long time dimensions, which is the case in our data.
We set T = 5 in what follows.19
5.2 Unemployment risk
Our second measure of background labor income risk is unemployment risk. This risk should also in
principle reflect idiosyncratic shocks to the (worker’s) firm so that it can vary across workers and
over time.20
We construct two indicators. The first is job loss risk induced by firm closure. We use the
Registry of Firm Bankruptcies, which records the date in which the firm is declared insolvent. We
construct an indicator of firm closure risk if the worker is currently working in a firm that will be
declared bankrupt in t years, and experiment by changing the lead value t. The usefulness of this
measure is that job losses arising from firm closures are involuntary (and hence unavoidable).
We also experiment with an alternative proxy of job loss risk based on the idea that workers
employed in more volatile firms (in terms of workforce turnover) face a greater likelihood of separation.
To allow for the fact that, even within volatile firms, workers of di↵erent skills may be exposed
to di↵erent risk of job loss, we construct this indicator separately for low- and high-education
workers. To build this measure, we start by constructing an indicator of firm/education-specific job
separation:
19The results are qualitatively similar if we use T = 3 or T = 4.
20Unemployment risk arising from macroeconomic fluctuations in economic activity constitutes uninsurable risk but,
being common to all workers, is of little help in identifying the e↵ect of labor income risk on financial decisions.
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JSjqt =
Fjqt
Sjqt 1
(10)
where Fjqt is the separation flow of workers of education q from firm j at time t, and Sjqt 1 the
corresponding stock at time t  1. There are two remarks about this measure: (a) unlike what done
in most of the literature, availability of worker-level data allows us to express the separation flow
Fjqt as gross rather than net employment changes; (b) not all separations reflect involuntary layo↵s
(some are voluntary quits or reflect events such as retirement, migration, intra-group mobility, etc.)
- and hence (10) is only a (noisy) proxy of unemployment risk. To isolate “excess job separations”,
we regress (10) on firm fixed e↵ects and dummies for year and size, and take the residuals from this
regression as our proxy of idiosyncratic job loss risk. This procedure captures how job separation
at the current firm di↵ers from that of a similar firm (in terms of size and business cycle) and
relative to its long-term behavior (since firms do not change industry denomination, the fixed e↵ect
component also accounts for industry-specific e↵ects).
The bottom part of Table 1 reports summary statistics for our measures of labor market risk
along with the estimated variances of the firms shocks. We find that the average variance of earnings
growth in our sample is 0.05, with a standard deviation of 0.11; both figures are small compared to
those estimated from survey data (e.g. Gourinchas and Parker, 2002 and Cocco et al. 2005) partly
reflecting absence of measurement error in our measure of earnings. In contrast, the variance of
firm value added growth is much larger (0.16), with an extremely large standard deviation of 0.49.
Finally, the last three rows report measures of the risk of firm closure and of job loss based on firm
turnover. The first risk appears contained - the average probability of firm closure is 0.2%. However,
the consequences of involuntary job loss associated with firm bankruptcy may be quite disastrous,
at least for some workers, due to scarring e↵ects.21 Allowing for job loss risk we can study the role
of idiosyncratic tail background risk in households financial decisions whose importance for assets
pricing has been recently stressed by Schmidt (2015).22 The last rows in the table report descriptive
statistics on our second proxy of job loss risk (firm-specific excess job separation rates). These rates
21Nilsen and Reiso (2010) study the long term unemployment consequences of displacement in Norway. They find
that five years after job displacement, the likelihood of being unemployed is still 17.2% among the ”treated” group
and only 7.8% among the ”control” group. The negative e↵ect decreases over time, but there is some unemployment
”scarring” e↵ect remaining even 10 years after the initial shock.
22Calibrated life cycle portfolio models find small e↵ects of uninsurable wage risk on the portfolio share in stocks
but larger e↵ects, particularly at young age, for the idiosyncratic risk of a job loss associated with a large wage cut
(Viceira, 2001; Cocco et al., 2005). However, this latter e↵ect is obtained assuming no unemployment insurance.
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are centered around zero (by design) and their standard deviation is around 19%. There are no
significant di↵erences between education levels.
6 The E↵ect of Background Risk on the Risky Portfolio Share
In this section we test whether and by how much investors mitigate uninsurable risk in their
human capital by reducing financial risk (through rebalancing of their financial portfolio away from
stocks). We start with regressions of the portfolio share of risky financial assets against a set of
socio-demographic characteristics of the household, our measures of risk - the variance of unexplained
wage growth- and households fixed e↵ects to capture general heterogeneity in preferences for risk
that can be correlated with uninsurable wage and unemployment risk. Of course, these fixed e↵ects
may also capture other sources of unobservable heterogeneity that may impact households portfolio
allocation - such as di↵erences in the precision of information about stock returns (Peress, 2004) or
financial sophistication (Calvet, Campbell and Sodini, 2009).
Our empirical specification includes a rich set of controls: a quadratic in age to model life
cycle portfolio e↵ects, year dummies which may capture passive variation in the asset share in
response to common changes in stock prices, and dummies for family type and area of residence. To
capture well-documented di↵erences in assets allocation due partly to fixed participation costs in
the stock market and financial sophistication (Campbell, 2006), we control for lagged wealth. To
account for interactions between levels of stockholding and housing (Cocco, 2004), we also control
for homeownership status. For the time being, we neglect the censoring issue, which we deal with in
the next section. Results of these estimates are shown in column (1) of Table 3.
The estimated coe cient on  2it is consistent with the idea that workers who face unavoidable
wage risk tend to take less financial risk. The e↵ect of wage risk is negative and very precisely
estimated. However, its size is small: one standard deviation increase in the (residual) variance of log
earnings would reduce the risky assets share by 0.12 percentage points. Because the average risky
assets share over the sample period is 21%, this amounts to 0.6% of the average sample share, too
small an e↵ect to matter. Hence, these estimates replicate the small economic e↵ect of uninsurable
wage risk that has been found in the literature.
The second column shows results of the reduced form regression for the share where the reduced
form instruments are the firm permanent and transitory variance of firms value added, and find
again negative coe cients and much smaller responses. As argued in Section 2, this is consistent
with the estimated e↵ect of the variance of firm value added being the product of the true response
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of the share to wage risk and the e↵ect of firms variability on the latter (typically considerably
smaller than 1, as shown in Table 2). Because of this, a regression of the share on the variance of
firm performance does not identify the marginal e↵ect of uninsurable wage risk.
Estimates change considerably when we instrument the wage growth variance with the permanent
and transitory variance of firm performance (column 3). The coe cient on the worker’s wage growth
variance is negative and highly statistically significant and its size (in absolute terms) increases
by a factor of 25 - from -0.02 to -0.5, resulting in a very high sensitivity of portfolio decisions
to uninsurable wage risk. Of course, the economic importance of wage risk depends both on its
marginal e↵ect as well as on the size of uninsurable wage risk. In Section 7 we discuss how we can
use our empirical strategy to obtain a plausible measurement of the latter and hence assess the
economic contribution of wage risk.
In the regressions reported in columns (2) and (3) we also include our preferred measure of
unemployment risk (firm closure). We find that the risk of firm closure discourages investment in
risky assets (and the e↵ect increases as we get closer to the firm closure event, which conforms with
intuition). But the marginal e↵ect is small. A ten-fold increase in the risk of firm closure from the
sample average would reduce the share invested in risky assets by 0.2 percentage points, about
1% of the sample mean share. The fact that workers reduce stock exposure in anticipation of firm
closure is prima facie evidence that they perceive this risk or the general distress of the firm. One
may wonder whether the response we document is small because workers avoid the risk they face
by abandoning in advance the ”sinking ship” and smoothly relocating to another firm. To assess
this possibility we estimate a probit model for the event of job mobility as a function of current
and future firm shocks and worker’s socio-demographic characteristics (the results are reported
in Appendix A3, Table A1). We find that future shocks to the firm growth and indicators for
whether the firm goes bankrupt within 1-2 years have no statistically significant e↵ect on mobility,
implying that there is no support for the idea that workers ”leave the ship before it sinks”. The
fact that workers adjust their investments in stocks in response to plant closure but do not relocate
is consistent with the idea that mobility is costly to implement and that protection against job loss
through labor market relocation is hard to come by due to frictions.
6.1 Dealing with censoring
The estimates in Table 3 address two of the issues that identification of the e↵ect of uninsurable wage
risk poses - unobserved heterogeneity and the endogeneity problems that characterize the measures
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of risk used in the literature. The third problem, neglected so far, is that about half of our sample
is censored from below at 0, i.e., there are on average about 45% stock market non-participants.
A formal treatment of censoring (e.g., through a Tobit approach) is unfeasible because we have
to deal simultaneously with three issues: endogeneity of the background risk measure, unobserved
heterogeneity in risk preferences which we capture with fixed e↵ects, and censoring. Honore` and Hu
(2004) propose an estimator that deals with these three issues at once, but their estimator is based
on strong assumptions. For example, it requires that the endogenous variable is bounded from
above and below (which in our case, where the endogenous variable is a variance, clearly is not).
Nevertheless, we can get a sense of the relative importance of the three issues for the estimates
of the e↵ect of background risk on the portfolio allocation by comparing five di↵erent models: (1)
Linear regression with households fixed e↵ects (FE); (2) IV linear regression with households fixed
e↵ects (IVFE) (both of which we have already discussed in Table 3); (3) IV linear regression in
which we replace the fixed e↵ects with a rich control function strategy that includes observable
fixed heterogeneity (IVC); (4) IV Tobit regression with the same control function (IVTC); and (5) a
”double control function” estimator (2IVTC), in which one assumes a linear relationship between
the fixed e↵ect and the endogenous covariates, as in Chamberlain (1984).
If the three issues (endogeneity, fixed e↵ects, censoring) are all important (and if the relationship
between the fixed e↵ect and the endogenous covariates takes a more general form), none of these
models delivers consistent estimates. However, the bias of each of these models is di↵erent and can
potentially be compared - as we do below - to gauge their relative importance and thus enable us to
say something about the true value of  . The online appendix provides a discussion of the di↵erent
biases.
We have already shown estimates for models (1) and (2) in Table 3 and reproduce the results
of (2) in the first column of Table 4. In the second column we drop the fixed e↵ects and replace
them with a rich control function that now includes nine dummies for the length of education, nine
dummies for the type of education, plus a dummy for the gender of the household head (which are
very key determinants of risk tolerance or financial sophistication, see Guiso and Sodini, 2013). The
estimate of   drops (in absolute value) from  0.5 to  0.41 (which is consistent with the idea that
omission of fixed e↵ects generates an upward bias, for example because more risk tolerant investors
select jobs with higher firm volatility). Though relatively large, this is not a dramatic drop from a
qualitative point of view, an indication that the upward bias from omitting fixed e↵ects is likely
contained (at least conditioning on the rich control function). Column (3) shows estimates of a
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formal Tobit IV model with the same control function as in column (2), which should eliminate the
bias from neglecting censoring. The estimate of   is smaller but in the same ballpark,  0.32. The
di↵erence between IVTC and IVC can be interpreted as the bias induced by censoring.23
In the final column (4) we implement a ”double control function” estimator.24 In a first step we
follow Blundell and Smith (1986), run a regression of our endogenous variable  2it on the (included
and excluded) instruments and their means (to account for individual fixed e↵ects in the wage
variances, as suggested by Chamberlain, 1984), and save the residuals, beit.25 In a second step, we
run a Tobit regression on  2it, the residual beit, the exogenous covariates Wit, and their means (to
account for individual fixed e↵ects in the risky share equation). While the estimate is noisier due to
the addition of many covariates, the size of the coe cient estimate is very similar, confirming the
general pattern of results.
The fact that the IVFE, IVC, IVTC and 2IVTC estimates are of the same order of magnitude
while the FE estimate is an order of magnitude smaller (in absolute value), suggests that the biases
from ignoring censoring or unobserved heterogeneity are sizable but comparatively much smaller
than the endogeneity bias. What is key is accounting for the latter.
6.2 Robustness
In this section we discuss various robustness analyses and extensions.
Variable definition Our main indicator of job loss risk (firm closure) may capture only tail
events. We hence consider the alternative measure described in Section 5.2 (firm/education job
separation risk, see equation (10)). The results are reported in Table 5, column (2). We find that
this alternative measure also discourages investment in risky assets, but the marginal e↵ect remains
small. A standard deviation increase in unemployment risk would reduce the share invested in risky
assets by only 0.2%, again too small an e↵ect to matter.
Our wage variance measure (7) weights all past realizations equally. However, the information
contained in more recent events may be more relevant for forming forecasts about wage risk. We
23Since the Tobit model is non-linear while all the other models are linear, the bias induced by omitting fixed e↵ects
is di↵erent for the IVTC and IVC estimators. Hence, the di↵erence between the two estimators reflects both censoring
and the di↵erent incidence of fixed e↵ects bias. We assume the latter di↵erence is small.
24We thank Francis Vella for suggesting this approach.
25In other words, we assume that  2it = z
0
it✓ +mi + "it. Chamberlain (1984) suggests to model the fixed e↵ect mi
as mi = z
0
i0a0 + ...+ z
0
iT aT + li. To reduce the computational burden, we assume instead mi = zi
0a+ li.
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hence experiment by constructing rolling averages that weight recent observations more than distant
observations (and do the same also for the firm variances (8) and (9)). In particular, we use declining
weights, such that the realization at time t is weighted twice as much as that of time t  1. Results
with this alternative weighting scheme are reported in Table 5, column (3). The marginal e↵ect is
somewhat smaller (-0.42), but the broad qualitative picture is unchanged.
Finally, we have assumed that stock market participants have at least the equivalent of $30
worth of risky assets in their portfolio. In columns (4) and (5) we use higher thresholds ($50 and
$100). The results are unchanged.
Instrument validity Our instruments for the workers’ unexplained wage volatility - the variance
of the permanent and transitory component of shocks to firm growth - may be invalid if the worker
can influence the outcome of the firm. This could happen with the top managers of the firm because
they exert a dominant role. To account for the possible bias induced by workers with dominant
position inside the firm we focus on large firms, where arguably influence of any worker on firm
productivity is diluted.
Our instruments may also be invalid if workers concentrate their stock investment in their firm’s
shares. This would give rise to an omitted variable problem because the portfolio share of risky
asset is inversely related to the variance of risky asset returns (as in classical Merton-type portfolio
choice models), which for investors holding significant shares of their firm may be directly related to
the variance of firm value added.26 To account for potential instrument invalidity due to ”own-firm
bias” in household portfolio, we drop individuals with any holdings in their own firm.27
Finally, a possible concern is that for a family what matters is the variation in total household
earnings, rather than that of the primary earner. Indeed, within-family insurance (for example
through added worker e↵ects) may invalidate the use of the primary earner’s wage volatility as a
measure of uninsured wage risk. To address this issue, we construct a measure of volatility based on
household earnings (while continuing to use the same set of instruments as in the baseline regression
- which refer to the primary earner). Similarly, one may be concerned that some individuals may
try to smooth some of their wage risk by holding multiple concurrent jobs. To tackle this issue we
26Døskeland and Hvide (2011) find that among Norwegian direct stockholders, 20% of the stock portfolio is held in
shares of current or previous (last 10 years) employers.
27The results are also robust to, instead of dropping individuals with holdings in their employers firm, redefining
the risky portfolio to include only stocks in firms other than their own (i.e., the share of risky assets is redefined as
S
0
it =
R0it
R0it+RFit
, with R0 being risky assets net of the value of own-firm stocks).
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redefine our measure of wage volatility by summing wages from all jobs (rather than using just the
main one). Correspondingly, we redefine our firm-specific instruments by weighting firm residuals
by the share of total wages received by each firm.
Results for these various robustness checks are shown in Table 6. In column (1) we reproduce
the baseline results. In columns (2) and (3) we report regressions when we retain only ”large” firms
(with size above the 25th and 50th percentile of the firm size distribution, respectively). As can be
seen, these exclusions - if anything- strengthen the estimated marginal e↵ect of background risk and
leave our qualitative conclusions unchanged. In column (4) we drop workers who have some assets
invested in their own firm. Since this group is rather small, the results barely change. Finally, in
columns (5) and (6) we take broader measures of uninsurable wage risk, which include earnings of
other household members28 or earnings from secondary jobs, respectively. The results are again
qualitatively una↵ected. In both cases, instruments are less powerful but still pass conventional
acceptability thresholds (and the Hansen test statistics reveal no sign of misspecification).
Sample selection In our last set of robustness checks we look at sample selection. Recall that
our baseline sample is composed of individuals who are continuously employed in the private sector.
This is because our instrument (firm shocks to value added) is undefined for those out of work and
for those employed in the public sector. However, we can assess the robustness of our estimates by
including in the sample individuals with spells in both the public and private sector (so that our
measure of wage variability (7) changes because it includes past periods in the public sector), but
continue to run our baseline regression (1) using only the periods in which individuals are observed
working in the private sector (so that the firm-related instrument remains defined). Similarly, we
can add to our sample those who had spells in the private sector amid spells of unemployment
(resulting in yearly earnings less than the threshold amount for unemployment benefits, with similar
adjustments to the variables). Results for these alternative samples are shown in Table 7. Clearly,
we are now dealing with much larger samples. The estimates are slightly reduced, but again remain
in the same ballpark.
In sum, looking at the broad picture coming out of Tables 5-7, the main message is one of
remarkable stability of our main findings.
28Household earnings volatility is obtained using the same methodology described in Section 5.1 (i.e., the variance
of the residual of a regression of household earnings on observables).
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6.2.1 Heterogeneity The e↵ect of uninsurable wage risk on the demand for risky assets should
be less important for households that have greater access to self-insurance (through bu↵ers of
accumulated assets). Similarly, pass-through coe cients of firm risk onto wages should be larger for
wealthier individuals, as they are more willing to bear risk coming from the firm side due to their
presumably higher risk tolerance.
These response heterogeneity predictions can be easily tested using interactions with household
wealth. The results are reported in Table 8. In the top panel we report pass-through estimates. The
first two columns replicate the estimates of the model of Table 2 using our sample (instead of the
universe of private sector workers). Ignoring interactions with wealth, pass-through estimates are
(reassuringly) very similar to those reported in Table 2. The last two columns show pass-through
estimates when permanent and transitory firm shocks are interacted with wealth. As expected,
firms o↵er less insurance to workers with higher wealth, particularly against permanent shocks (the
interaction with transitory shocks is not statistically significant).
In Panel B, we augment our baseline risky portfolio share regressions by interacting the variance
of the worker’s wage growth with lagged log financial wealth (and using as additional instruments
the interaction of the latter with the firm’s transitory and permanent shock variances). We find
again intuitive results: the marginal e↵ect of uninsurable wage risk on the demand for risky assets
declines as the level of financial wealth increases.29
Figure 3 plots the pass-through e↵ect (the dotted line on the left-hand scale, obtained considering
29These results can also be used to address the criticism that our estimate of the marginal e↵ect of wage risk is high
due to local (LATE) e↵ects (Angrist and Imbens, 1994). It is well known that in the presence of response heterogeneity
the IV estimator estimates (under some assumptions) not the ”average treatment e↵ect” (in our case, the average
decline in the share of risky assets in portfolio that follows an increase in wage risk), but a ”local average treatment
e↵ect”, which may be interpreted as the average treatment e↵ect for the individuals who are mostly a↵ected by a
change in the instrument (i.e., the firm-related risk). For the LATE interpretation to be responsible for the high value
of our baseline estimate, we need the coe cient of the interaction in the pass-through regressions to be of opposite sign
to the coe cient of the interaction in the share regressions (those mostly a↵ected by the change in the instruments,
i.e., those with a larger pass-through coe cient, should be the ones with the larger sensitivity of uninsurable wage risk
to the demand for risky assets). However, we find exactly the opposite, suggesting that LATE is unlikely to be an
issue. In unreported regressions (available on request) we generalize this exercise by allowing the partial insurance
coe cients to vary with a whole vector of observable individual and firm characteristics: length and type of education,
wealth, firm size, age, gender. And the same we do for the portfolio share equation. Though we find that some of
these variables (namely schooling, wealth and firm size) are significant shifters of the pass-though and/or of the e↵ect
of background risk on the share of risky assets in portfolio, we do not find anything systematic that would make us
conclude that a LATE interpretation is justified.
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permanent firm shocks only) and the marginal e↵ect of uninsurable wage risk on the portfolio share
for households (the continuous line on the right-hand scale) at di↵erent points of the distribution of
wealth. Pass-through is always positive and it varies between 0.05 and 0.1 as wealth moves from the
bottom to the top percentile.
The marginal e↵ect of uninsurable wage risk on portfolio allocation is negative at all levels of
wealth. However, while at the bottom of the distribution is large (around -1 or less), it is around
-0.5 at median wealth and very close to zero at the top percentile of financial wealth - consistent
with the prediction of a self-insurance model. As we discuss in the next session, this wealth-induced
heterogeneity in workers’ insulation from firms shocks and in response to wage risk translates in
heterogeneity in the relevance of wage risk. Furthermore, since total wealth and even more so the
holdings of risky assets are heavily concentrated, the e↵ect of uninsurable wage risk on the aggregate
demand for risky assets is likely small - a calculation we perform formally in the next Section.
7 Quantifying the e↵ect of uninsurable wage risk
The quantitative assessment of the importance of uninsurable wage risk hinges on two ingredients.
The first is the size of  , the marginal e↵ect of a unit increase in the risk arising from on-the-job
wage variation. A broad reading of our findings suggests that   t  0.5 for the average/median
wealth investor. We will use this value to perform our calculations. The second ingredient is the size
of overall uninsurable wage risk. Gauging the latter is more problematic. We cannot use the size of
the unobserved wage variance precisely because of the argument that not all residual variation is
risk. However, we can provide bounds of the overall e↵ect on the portfolio share.
From (3), uninsurable wage risk is defined as:
Bit = ✓
2
vVit + ✓
2
fFit
For given values of the estimated Fit and Vit - the variance of the firm’s value added growth
and the variance of the worker’s earnings growth, respectively - the size of uninsurable wage risk
depends on ✓v, the extent of worker-specific variation that is due to risk rather than choice, and the
pass-through of firms shocks to wages ✓f . To assess the importance of uninsurable wage risk we
consider two exercises. First, we compute the contribution of estimated wage risk to the portfolio
share as:
b  bBit = b ⇣ b✓2v bVit + b✓2f bFit⌘ (11)
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Second, we estimate the e↵ect on the risky portfolio share of changing wage risk from this
estimated baseline by varying workers exposure to firm specific risk ✓f or increasing the share of
worker-specific wage variation that is risk, ✓v:
b  Bit = b ⇣(✓2v   b✓2v)bVit + (✓2f   b✓2f ) bFit⌘
This computation assesses the economic importance of uninsurable wage risk by counterfactually
”shocking” the two parameters that capture workers’ exposure to risk, one through institutions
or extent of superior information workers may have about evolution of their wages, ✓v; the other
through firm-provided insurance, ✓f . Shocking ✓f is of interest because, as shown by Lemieux et al.
(2009) and Benabou and Tirole (2015), there is strong evidence of a rise of pay for performance
wage schemes and high-powered incentives over the past decade, not only among workers in top
positions but also among low rank employees.30 And competitive pressure for talent could make
incentives even more powered in the future.
To perform these calculations we take the pass-through coe cient with respect to permanent
firm shocks, b✓f = 0.07 (because the response to transitory shocks is tiny, and hence adding it would
make little di↵erence). To quantify the baseline share of worker-specific wage variation that is risk,b✓v, we consider the following argument: under the assumptions that censoring bias is unimportant,
insurance within the firm is substantial (both backed by the estimates in Table 2 and the evidence
in Table 4), and measurement error is negligible (given the administrative nature of the data), then
p lim b FE ⇡ b✓2vp lim b IV FE . Hence, one can infer that b✓v ⇡ 0.2. We might expect b✓v to represent a
lower bound for the true ✓v, both because of some measurement error in wages and because there
may be additional sources of background risk that our empirical strategy is missing. Finally, we
estimate Fit and Vit using the variance of the firm’s value added growth and the variance of the
worker’s earnings growth, respectively: bFit = 0.16 and bVit = 0.053, from Table 1.31
The surface we plot in Figure 4 is the economic e↵ect of uninsurable wage risk on the share of
risky assets in portfolio, computed using (11) as:
b ⇣✓2v bVit + ✓2f bFit⌘
30Lemieux et al. (2009) show that in the US between the 1970’s and the 1990’s, the fraction of workers paid on the
basis of performance rose from 38% to 45%, and for salaried workers from 45% to 60%. This pattern is not confined
to the US. Bloom and Van Reenen (2010), for instance, document that the fraction of UK establishments using some
form of performance pay rose from 41% in 1984 to 55% in 2004.
31In fact, an estimate of Vit should subtract, from the variance of wage growth, the contribution of the firm
component - which is however tiny given the extent of insurance within the firm.
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where we use the baseline estimate b  =  0.5. The crossing between the two darker lines on the
surface marks the sample estimates combination (b✓v, b✓f ).
Evaluated at the average values of Vit and Fit and at the point estimates of the parameters
(b , b✓v, b✓f ) the economic e↵ect of uninsurable wage risk is tiny: the predicted decline in the share of
risky assets is -0.14 percentage points. However, if workers were to share equally the firm-specific
risk (✓f = 0.5), for given ✓v, the e↵ect would be as high as 2 percentage points (or 10 percent of
the average share of risky assets in portfolio). In contrast, holding constant ✓f , while increasing
the amount of worker-specific variation that is due to risk rather than choice, leaves the e↵ect of
background risk on the demand for stocks fairly small. Indeed, even if half of the worker-specific
wage variation was risk, the e↵ect of uninsurable wage risk would remain small: a predicted 0.7
percentage point decline. This is visible from the slope of the surface, which is steeper when we
move along the ✓f -axis than when we move along the ✓v-axis. This di↵erence in the e↵ect of an
equally sized increase in ✓f and ✓v follows from the larger variance of firms shocks bFit, which is
three times larger than the worker specific wage variationbVit, implying a much larger increase in
wage risk when ✓f rather than ✓v increases.
We have documented substantial wealth-induced heterogeneity in the pass-through of firm-related
shocks onto wages as well as in the sensitivity of the demand for stocks to uninsurable wage risk.
Consequently, we should expect substantial heterogeneity in the economic e↵ect of the latter. To
illustrate, we consider the e↵ect for households at the 5-th and 95-th percentile of the wealth
distribution. The estimates of b  are, respectively, -0.97 and -0.097. The other important element
that varies is the pass-through coe cient, which takes values 0.06 and 0.10, respectively for the
5-th and 95-th percentile of the wealth distribution. Evaluated at the average values of Vit and Fit
and at the point estimates of the parameters b✓v, b✓f , the economic e↵ect of background risk are still
small in both groups (-0.23 percentage points at the 5-th wealth percentile and -0.06 percentage
points at the 95-th percentile). Figure 5 reports the corresponding wage risk e↵ect surfaces for the
two groups.
For the wealthy, neither variations in ✓f nor ✓v would a↵ect their background risk response
much. The response surface is fundamentally flat. In contrast, the slope of the surface among the
poor is much steeper; a reduction in firm insurance could potentially have large impact on their
portfolio choice, reducing even further the amounts of wealth held in risky instruments. For these
workers, sharing half of the shocks to their firms would lower the portfolio share in risky assets by
about 15 percentage points, a very large drop. Also an increase in wage risk unrelated to the firm’s
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fortunes could have a substantial impact. However, because these workers own a small fraction of
total stocks, these larger e↵ects are unlikely to generate large aggregate consequences (which we
document next).
As our last exercise, we look at the e↵ect of uninsurable wage risk for the aggregate demand for
stocks in the baseline and in the hypothetical scenarios in which we vary the extent of risk faced by
individuals. We allow for wealth-related heterogeneity in both the pass-through of firms shocks and
the portfolio sensitivity to uninsurable wage risk. This exercise is relevant for understanding the
role of uninsurable wage risk for asset prices.
To perform this exercise, we consider an increase in ✓f and ✓v from their point estimate to 0.5,
so that workers share 50% of the permanent shocks to their firm and 50% of their personal wage
variation is risk. For a given worker i with initial wealth Ait 1 the e↵ect on the risky share of raising
✓v and ✓f from (b✓v, b✓f ) to (0.5, 0.5) is:
 Si = (b (Ait 1)⇣0.25bVit + 0.25 bFit⌘  b (Ait 1)⇣b✓2v bVit + (b✓f (Ait 1))2 bFit⌘
and that on the individual demand for stocks:
Change in demand for stocks=Ait 1 Sit
Accordingly, our estimate of the e↵ect on the aggregate demand for stocks is
% change in aggregate demand for stocks=(
X
i
Ait 1 Sit)/(Total stockst-1)
We estimate this e↵ect to be 0.2% on average over all sample years - a tiny response to a large
change in uninsurable wage risk. Increasing the size of the shock by setting ✓f and ✓v to 0.8 leaves
the result qualitatively unchanged. The reason why the aggregate demand for stocks is insensitive
to wage risk is that the e↵ect is small at high wealth levels, and the ownership of risky assets is
concentrated precisely among the wealthy (the top 5% holds 78% percent of the stock market in
Norway and the top 10% holds 87%). In fact, we calculate that among the households with below
median wealth increasing ✓f and ✓v to 0.5 lowers the demand for risky assets by 2.8% while it has a
negligible e↵ect among households with above median wealth.
Overall, the calculations in this section imply that uninsurable wage risk is economically important
for individuals with low assets; for those who can count on a su ciently high level of bu↵er savings
the tempering e↵ect of uninsurable wage risk is contained. The combination of very high sensitivity
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among the poor, low sensitivity among the wealthy and the concentration of risky assets in the
hands of the latter implies a small e↵ect of even large increases in uninsurable wage risk on the
aggregate demand for risky assets. This suggests a small role of uninsurable wage risk as a driver of
asset prices.
8 Conclusions
In this paper we have argued that achieving identification of the e↵ect of wage risk on people’s
financial decisions poses important conceptual challenges and formidable data requirements. Using
extremely rich and virtually error-free Norwegian administrative data we estimate firm-related
measures of workers’ earnings variation to isolate exogenous changes in uninsurable wage risk. We
show that once the endogeneity of usual measures of wage risk is properly addressed and unobserved
heterogeneity and censoring of stock investments are accounted for, the estimated sensitivity of
the risky portfolio share of the average household to earnings risk can be up to 25 times larger
than the estimates obtained ignoring these issues, as done in the existing literature. Furthermore,
the sensitivity di↵ers depending on wealth bu↵ers accumulated by the household, spanning from
irrelevance at the top of the wealth distribution to sensitivity that is three times the average for
people at the bottom. While sensitivity to uninsurable wage risk is very large, we find small
sensitivity to unemployment risk, possibly because of generous unemployment insurance in Norway.
Can uninsurable wage risk explain the large amount of heterogeneity in portfolio composition
observed in the data? Answering this question requires a consistent estimate of the marginal e↵ect
of uninsurable wage risk, which we have, and a comprehensive measure of the size of uninsurable
wage risk, which we can bound. At sample means and for the median wealth household the
contribution of uninsurable wage risk is small, not because sensitivity is small but because firms
provide substantial wage insurance to their workers.32 However, because marginal responses di↵er
considerably depending on the bu↵ers accumulated, the economic importance of uninsurable wage
risk varies greatly: it is relatively large for the poor and negligible for the wealthy. In this sense,
uninsurable wage risk is a viable explanation of portfolio heterogeneity among low wealth people
but not among the high wealth segment. Moreover, as the wealthy hold most of the risky assets
32This result is in line with Berk and Walden (2013). In their paper, the authors propose that most workers get
their optimal risk allocation through the employment contract, and therefore have no need to participate in stock
markets. It is thus not that agents do not care about background risk, but rather that their background risk is well
aligned with their consumption risk. Our identification strategy separates scope from motive and identify the latter.
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in the economy, wage risk is unlikely to matter for asset pricing. Finally, our empirical strategy
identifies the parameters that drive uninsurable wage risk and the portfolio response to it, hence
allowing us to run meaningful counterfactuals. We show that the adoption of high-powered wage
incentive contracts can cause large responses in portfolio composition, particularly for people below
median wealth. In sum, our strategy allows to say when, for what and for whom wage risk matters:
it matters when firms o↵er little insurance, it matters for understanding why people with low wealth
bu↵ers are reluctant to invest in stocks, and it is unlikely to matter for stock prices.
The idea of separating motive from scope that guides our methodology to assess the role of
wage risk for the demand of risky assets can be extended to study portfolio hedging against human
capital risk. If the firm component of workers’ wages correlates di↵erentially with single listed
stocks, then workers may rely on the stock market to hedge their human capital risk, as first noted
by Myers (1972). However, if workers receive considerable wage insurance from their firm the scope
for hedging can be limited even though the motive may be strong. Because we can identify the
degree of insurance (and note that this is partial), our methodology can be used to identify the
strength of the hedging motive. The pursuit of this idea is the next step in our research agenda.
In this paper we have focused on two sources of background risk - wage risk and unemployment
risk. Given the large weight that human wealth has in the lifetime resources of most individuals,
these are probably the most important sources of background risk for most individuals. But they are
not the only ones. For homeowners, unanticipated shocks to housing wealth is another, and given
the illiquidity of housing it cannot easily be avoided; for entrepreneurs, private business wealth, is
still another - and has been studied by Heaton and Lucas (2000a, 2000b). These di↵erent sources of
background risk share one common feature: each one accounts for a substantial share of a consumer
lifetime resources. Thus, even if the e↵ect of each one may be relatively contained, their joint e↵ect
on households assets allocation may be substantial. We have contributed to quantify one of them.
More work is needed to quantify the others.33
33Palia et al. (2014) study the e↵ect of volatility in returns to human capital, housing and private equity on the
risky portfolio share. Unfortunately their study su↵ers from the endogeneity issues that we have stressed in this study
(as it assumes that all measured variation in labor income, housing and private equity returns is background risk).
Calibration exercises show the potential importance of housing return risk for the composition of the financial portfolio
(Cocco, 2005) and of returns to private wealth (Heaton and Lucas, 2000b). But a proper empirical assessment of these
sources is still missing and faces the same identification problems as those faced by human capital risk.
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A Appendix
A.1 Data sets
The analysis uses several data sources maintained by Statistics Norway that can be combined
through unique personal and household identifiers over time.
The Central Population Register
The Central Population register contains end of year information on all Norwegian residents for the
time period 1993-2011 and contains individual demographic information (i.e., gender, day of birth,
county of residence and marital status). It also contains family identifiers allowing us to match
spouses and cohabiting couples with common children. Identifying un-married couples without
common children is not possible in our sample period.
Administrative Tax and Income Records
Because households in Norway are subject to a wealth tax, they are every year required to report
their complete income and wealth holdings to the tax authority, and the data are available every
year from 1993 to 2011. Each year, before taxes are filed in April (for the previous year), employers,
banks, brokers, insurance companies and any other financial intermediaries are obliged to send
both to the individual and to the tax authority, information on the value of the asset owned by
the individual and administered by the employer or the intermediary, as well as information on the
income earned on these assets. In case an individual holds no stocks, the tax authority pre-fills a
tax form and sends it to the individual for approval; if the individual does not respond, the tax
authority considers the information it has gathered as approved. In 2011, as many as 2,4 million
individuals in Norway (66% of the tax payers) belonged to this category.34 If the individual or
household owns stocks then he has to fill in the tax statement - including calculations of capital
gains/losses and deduction claims. The statement is sent back to the tax authority, which, as in the
previous case receives all the basic information from employers and intermediaries and can thus
check its truthfulness and correctness. Stockholders are treated di↵erently because the government
wants to save on the time necessary to fill in more complex tax statements and to reduce the risk
of litigation due to miscalculated deductions on capital losses and taxes on capital gains. Traded
financial assets are reported at market value. For stocks in non-listed companies that are not traded
34See the 2011 Annual Report from the Norwegian Tax Administration, http://www.skatteetaten.no/en/.
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the company itself has to provide a tax report to the tax registry every year. In this report the
company proposes a value of the company by the end of the year. This value should be the total net
worth of the company, after deducting any debts. All assets have to be included in the valuation,
expect goodwill which is not included. The tax authority may adjust the value of the company
upwards after going over the report, if it does not find the proposed value reasonable. Obviously
this leads to undervaluation of the companies, but this is bound as unrealistically low figures would
cause the tax authority to start a more thorough investigation.
This procedure, particularly the fact that financial institutions supply information on their
customers’ financial assets directly to the tax authority, makes tax evasion very di cult, and thus
non-reporting or under-reporting of assets holdings are likely to be negligible.
The Norwegian National Educational Database
Educational attainment is reported by the educational establishment directly to Statistics Norway
at the individual level, hence minimizing the measurement error. The information includes on every
student the highest level of education) at the individual level as of October every year.
The Register of Shareholders
The register consists of all Norwegian limited liability companies. Importantly the register contains
information about shareholders and received dividends. Dividends are reported at the yearly level,
and ownership is reported as of December 31st each year.
Employer-Employee Register
All firms hiring workers in Norway are required to report all work relationships to the Central
Employer-Employee register. This includes registering the date and individual ID for the each
time an employment relationship is established or terminated and when permanent changes are
made to the registered information about working hours, job title (occupation code) and workplace
(department). The register also contains the organization number of the firm and the sum of
total payments (wages and remuneration) from the firm to the worker at a yearly level. When a
worker has work relationships with several firms during the year, we select the firm with the highest
payments to the worker that year as the main work-relationship.
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The Central Register of Establishments and Enterprises
The register contains all enterprises and establishments in the private and public sector in Norway.
For our purposes we select information on organization ID, geographical information, institutional
sector, industrial classification (NACE), number of employees.
Firm Balance Sheet register
Contains accounts and balance sheet information from the financial statements of all non-financial
firm. We extract all variables needed to calculate value added per worker. Some of the main
variables and definitions:
Operating income and operating expenses are ordinary income and expenses outside financial ones.
Operating income is divided into sales revenues (taxable and tax-free), rental income, commission
revenues, profits from the sale of fixed assets and other operating-related revenues. Operating
expenses include changes in stocks, costs of raw materials and consumables used, wages and salaries,
depreciation and write-downs of tangible fixed assets and intangible fixed assets as well as a number
of di↵erent types of other operating expenses. Examples of operating expenses that are specified
are subcontracting, repair and maintenance and expenses relating to means of transport.
Cost of raw materials and consumables used includes stock changes of work in progress and
finished goods.
Wages and salaries include wages, holiday pay, employers’ national insurance premium, pension
costs and other personnel expenses.
Financial income and financial expenses are ordinary revenues and expenses relating to invest-
ments, securities, receivables and liabilities. The financial items also include share of earnings
relating to foreign exchange gains and losses (agio) and value changes of market-based current asset
investments.
Extraordinary revenues and expenses apply to material items that are unusual for the business
and do not occur regularly.
Taxes represent taxes relating to the accounting result, and consist of taxes payable, expected
reimbursement claims from owners and changes in deferred taxes. Taxes payable are the taxes
expected to be assessed on the year’s taxable income corrected for any discrepancy between calculated
and assessed taxes the year before.
Allocation of the profit/loss for the year shows how a profit is allocated and losses are covered.
It provides information on transfers to/from equity and dividends to owners.
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Fixed assets cover assets that are mainly included in the enterprise’s long-term creation of value
and are intended for permanent ownership or use, as well as receivables and securities scheduled for
repayment later than one year after the time of settlement. This includes tangible fixed assets broken
down into buildings and facilities, facilities under construction, transport equipment, machinery etc.
Long-term receivables and investments are included as fixed assets, such as investments in other
activities and loans to enterprises in the same group.
Current assets are assets relating to the enterprise’s sales of goods and services, or which are
expected to have a functional period of less than one year in operation. This includes cash and
short-term capital investments (cash, bank deposits, shares, bonds etc.), receivables and inventories.
Receivables are current assets if it has been agreed or scheduled that they shall be repaid within
one year after the end of the financial year.
Equity is the portion of the total capital belonging to the owners, and is shown as the value
of assets less liabilities. Equity is classified in two main divisions, invested equity and retained
earnings. Invested equity consists of share capital and share premium accounts. Retained earnings
consist of fund for assessment di↵erences and other reserves/uncovered losses.
Liabilities cover all obligations that can come to place restrictions on the future use of the
enterprise’s resources, and are divided into provisions for liabilities and charges (pension commitments,
deferred tax liabilities, etc., other long-term liabilities and short-term liabilities. Long-term liabilities
are legal or financial obligations not meant to be redeemed during the coming accounting period,
and are not related to the enterprise’s short-term sales of goods and services. Short-term liabilities
are liabilities that fall due for payment within one year from the time of settlement, or are directly
related to the enterprise’s short-term sales of goods and services.
Register of Bankruptcies
The register contains the firm number and the exact date of bankruptcy at the firm level. All
juridical objects, which includes all types of firms/enterprises and individuals who have unpaid
accounts and are by definition insolvent, can be declared bankrupt.
A.2 Sample Selection
We start with a data set on income recipients that merges record from the Central Population
Register and the Administrative Tax and Income Register. This merged data set includes 29,814,364
person-year observations for the period 1995 to 2010. Given that we need to use as an instrument
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a measure of firm-level risk, we focus on a sample of individuals who are continuously employed
in the private sector (sector 710 or 717). This excludes those who are not working (unemployed,
retired, disabled, etc.) and those who have a spell in the government sector. This sample selection
leaves us with 9,888,562 observations. Next, we exclude individuals who are younger than 25 (and
hence possibly still in school) and those older than 60 (who may have intermittent participation,
and also have widespread access to early retirement, typically from the age of 62, see e.g., Vestad
2014). We are left with 7,566,412 observations. Merging this data set with firm-level information
reduces the usable sample to 6,501,730 observations (this sample reduction is due to some missing
information in the firm data set used to construct the measure of firm value added, exclusion of
short lived firms -those that are active for less than 3 years- and some inconsistencies in the reported
firm number in the Employer/Employee registry vs. the Balance sheet registry). Next, we exclude
individuals who have earnings below the basic amount threshold of the Norwegian Social Insurance
Scheme (grunnbelopet) in one or more years and are left with 5,168,462 observations. Even though
we restrict the sample of workers between 25 and 60 years of age, some students are still left in the
sample, and will typically have low incomes.35 Further, workers who have some period of disability
of sick leave, will often have less than full-time positions, potentially in several firms. To reduce
the impact of such outliers, we drop all the observations where earnings growth is less than -80%
or more than 500% (and are left with 5,115,196 observations). Since we run regressions at the
household level, we keep only the primary earner of the household (4,846,766 observations left). The
number of observations in the various regressions we run are less than this because we use lags for
constructing some of the variables and instruments.
35The incentive to stay below this threshold is significant as the government stipend to all students is reduced
almost one-to-one for each dollar earned above a threshold only marginally higher than grunnbelopet.
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A.3 Mobility Regressions
Table A.1: Worker mobility
(1) (2)
Mover Mover
gjt 0.242⇤⇤⇤ 0.242⇤⇤⇤
(0.0292) (0.0292)
gjt+1 0.0278 0.0278
(0.0267) (0.0267)
gjt+2 0.0256 0.0256
(0.0193) (0.0193)
Firm bankrupt in 1 year 0.453
(0.319)
Firm bankrupt in 2 years 0.0769
(0.344)
Observations 3,219,340 3,219,340
Notes: The table reports marginal e↵ect estimates of a probit regression for the event of job mobility as a function of current (gjt)
and future firm shocks and worker’s socio-demographic characteristics. In addition to the reported coe cients the regressions
also control for log firm size, dummy variables for individuals being recipients of sickness money, maternity/paternity benefits,
unemployment insurance, as well as education indicators (type and length), family type, area dummies, a quadratic in age,
gender and year dummies. Clustered standard errors are in brackets. Coe cient significance: *** at 1 % or less; ** at 5 %; *
at 10 %.
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Figures & Tables
Figure 1. The evolution of stock market participation and the share of risky assets in
household portfolios
Notes: The figure shows the average share of wealth held in risky assets (left scale) and the fraction of stockholders (right scale)
among Norwegian households, by year.
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Figure 2. The distribution of the share of risky assets in household portfolios
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Notes: The figure shows the sample distribution of the share of risky assets in the portfolio of Norwegian households. Bin size
= 0.02.
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Figure 3. Wealth-induced heterogeneity in pass-through and marginal e ect of wage risk
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Notes: The dotted line shows the pass-through coe cient of permanent shocks to firm value added onto workers’ wages, by
worker wealth percentile (left-hand scale). The line is obtained using the estimates reported in Table 8, Panel A. The solid line
shows the IV estimate of the marginal e ect of wage risk on the share in risky assets, again by wealth percentile (right-hand
scale). The line is obtained using the estimates of Table 8, Panel B.
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Figure 4. The e ect of wage risk on the share of risky assets
Notes: The surface plot represents the percentage points reduction (on the vertical line) in the portfolio share in risky assets by
Norwegian households as we vary the level of insurance within the firm (◊f ) and the fraction of non-firm related wage variation
that is not avoidable (◊v). The crossing of the darker lines on the surface corresponds to the point estimates of the pass-through
of permanent firm shocks on wages and the share of non-firm related wage variability that is not avoidable (from the baseline
specifications).
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Figure 5. The e ect of wage risk for low and high wealth samples
Notes: The surface plots represent the percentage points reduction (on the vertical line) in the portfolio share in risky assets
held by rich households (corresponding to the 95-th percentile of the wealth distribution, the top surface) and poor households
(corresponding to the 5-th percentile of the wealth distribution, the bottom surface). Movements along the surfaces are due to
di erent combinations of the level of insurance within the firm (◊f ) and the fraction of non-firm related wage variation that is
not avoidable (◊v). The crossing of the darker lines on the two surfaces corresponds to the point estimates of the pass-through
of permanent firm shocks to wages and the share of wage variability that is not avoidable (separately by wealth, see Table 8).
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics, 1995-2010
Variable Mean Std. Dev. N
Age 45.518 8.545 1,972,639
Male 0.816 0.387 1,972,639
Less than High School 0.196 0.397 1,972,639
High School 0.564 0.496 1,972,639
Some College or more 0.24 0.427 1,972,639
Family size 2.881 1.405 1,972,639
Value of risky assets 479,458.1 8,854,058.0 1,972,639
Value of safe assets 359,031.3 2,253,133.8 1,972,639
Share risky assets 0.207 0.293 1,972,639
Participation share 0.552 0.497 1,972,639
Cond. share risky assets 0.375 0.304 1,089,477
Earnings 415,686.0 233,517.7 1,972,639
Earnings, family 530,971.1 306,566.9 1,972,639
Variance earnings growth 0.053 0.105 1,972,639
Variance earnings growth, family 0.077 0.127 1,972,639
Variance value added growth 0.16 0.493 284,627
Permanent shocks 0.044 0.179 205,874
Transitory shocks 0.051 0.249 243,632
Firm size 26.88 141.374 347,813
Firm bankrupt in 1 year 0.002 0.044 1,972,639
Job separation rate residual
High education 0.003 0.192 253,017
Low educaction 0.001 0.194 227,402
Notes: The table shows summary statistics of households and firm characteristics. The portfolio and wealth variables, and the
wage risk measures refer to our baseline sample (see Appendix A2). Asset and earnings values are NOK in 2010 prices (1 USD
approx. 5.61 USD).
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Table 2. Pass-through of firms’ shocks to workers’ wages
(1) (2)
Permanent value Transitory value
added shocks added shocks
Pass-through coef. 0.0705*** 0.0175***
(0.0056) (0.0053)
Constant -0.0021*** -0.0023***
(0.0002) (0.0002)
Hansen J-test p-value 0.54 0.00
F-stat 1st stage 134.21 688.46
Observations 2,358,889 2,370,420
Notes: The table reports estimates of the pass-through coe cient of permanent (column (1)) and transitory shocks (column
(2)) to the firm’s performance onto its workers’ wages, using the identification strategy of Guiso, Pistaferri and Schivardi (2005).
Clustered standard errors are in brackets. Coe cient significance: *** at 1 % or less; ** at 5 %; * at 10 %.
53
Table 3. The e ect of labor income risk on the financial portfolio share
(1) (2) (3)
Fixed e ect Reduced form Fixed e ect IV
fixed e ect (Baseline)
‡2it -0.0202*** -0.4986***
(0.0029) (0.1827)
F Pit -0.0033***
(0.0012)
F Tit -0.0028***
(0.0007)
Firm bankrupt in 1 year -0.0112** -0.0201***
(0.0050) (0.0066)
Firm bankrupt in 3 years 0.0008 -0.0040
(0.0027) (0.0034)
Firm bankrupt in 5 years 0.0006 -0.0020
(0.0028) (0.0035)
Lagged log wealth 0.0153*** 0.0104*** 0.0112***
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003)
Home ownership 0.0176*** 0.0135*** 0.0146***
(0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0012)
Age 0.0224*** 0.0195*** 0.0222***
(0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0017)
Age sq. -0.0002*** -0.0001*** -0.0001***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Family size -0.0005 0.0005 -0.0013*
(0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0008)
Hansen J-test p-value 0.13
F-stat 1st stage 56.85
Observations 1,972,639 1,655,104 1,184,800
Notes: The table reports estimates of the marginal e ect of wage and unemployment risk on the risky financial portfolio share.
Column (1) shows fixed e ect regressions; Column (2) reports reduced form regressions of the share on the two instruments -
the variance of transitory and permanent shocks to firm’s value added. Column (3) shows IV estimates. Regressions also control
for family type, area, and year dummies. Hansen J-test for instrument validity and F-stat for the power of the instruments are
shown at the bottom of the table. Clustered standard errors are in brackets. Coe cient significance: *** at 1 % or less; ** at
5 %; * at 10 %.
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Table 4. Assessing the relevance of unobserved heterogeneity and censoring
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Fixed e ect IV IV with Tobit IV with Tobit w/ double
(Baseline) control function control function control function
‡2it -0.4986*** -0.4144*** -0.3199*** -0.373*
(0.1827) (0.1152) (0.1806) (0.1990)
Firm bankrupt in 1 year -0.0201*** -0.0032 -0.0157 -0.0211
(0.0066) (0.0069) (0.0125) (0.0134)
Firm bankrupt in 3 years -0.0040 0.0037 0.0025 0.0030
(0.0034) (0.0047) (0.0085) (0.0083)
Firm bankrupt in 5 years -0.0020 0.0055 0.0057 0.0074
(0.0035) (0.0048) (0.0089) (0.0085)
Lagged log wealth 0.0112*** 0.0535*** 0.1187*** 0.0614***
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0005) (0.0007)
Home ownership 0.0146*** 0.0248*** 0.0553*** 0.0190***
(0.0012) (0.0011) (0.0021) (0.0026)
Age 0.0222*** 0.0141*** 0.0235*** 0.0153***
(0.0017) (0.0011) (0.0017) (0.0017)
Age sq. -0.0001*** -0.0002*** -0.0003*** -0.0004***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Family size -0.0013* 0.0076*** 0.0143*** 0.0056***
(0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0011) (0.0016)
Male 0.0294*** 0.0298*** 0.0292***
(0.0016) (0.0027) (0.0027)
Education length indicators1 799.88 945.86 576.46
[0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000]
Education type indicators1 628.90 426.90 467.18
[0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000]
Hansen J-test p-value 0.13 0.05 0.08
F-stat 1st stage 56.85 347.91 347.91
Observations 1,184,800 1,230,063 1,230,063 1,230,063
Notes: The table reports estimates of the marginal e ect of wage and unemployment risk on the risky financial portfolio share.
Column (1) reproduces the IV benchmark regression of Table 3, Column (3); Column (2) shows IV estimates but replaces
the fixed e ect with a control function; Column (3) shows Tobit IV estimates using the same control function; Column (4)
shows Tobit estimates with double control functions. All regressions include controls for family type, year and area dummies.
Regressions in columns (2)-(3) add controls for gender, as well as education length and type indicators. Further, column (4)
includes also means of the control variables at the individual level, and the residual from an OLS-regression of ‡2it on the
reported control variables, FPit and FTit , as well as the individual means of the latter. Hansen J-test for instrument validity and
F-stat for the power of the instruments are shown at the bottom of the table. In the third column the reported p-value for
the test for instrument validity comes from a two-step procedure for computational reasons. Clustered standard errors are in
brackets. Coe cient significance: *** at 1 % or less; ** at 5 %; * at 10 %.
1)Reported are the Chi Sq-statistics for a test of joint significance of respectively 9 education length and 9 education type
indicators, p-values in square brackets.
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Table 5. Robustness: including individual-specific unemployment risk, quadratic weights
and varying threshold for risky asset market participation.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Fixed e ect IV (Baseline) with:
Fixed e ect IV unemployment quadratic risky assets > risky assets >
(Baseline) risk weights 50 USD 100 USD
‡2it -0.4986*** -0.5052*** -0.4159*** -0.4922*** -0.5002***
(0.1827) (0.1830) (0.1692) (0.1826) (0.1830)
Firm bankrupt in 1 year -0.0201*** -0.0178*** -0.0152** -0.0200*** -0.0196***
(0.0066) (0.0067) (0.0070) (0.0066) (0.0066)
Firm bankrupt in 3 years -0.0040 -0.0042 -0.0021 -0.0039 -0.0035
(0.0034) (0.0034) (0.0034) (0.0034) (0.0034)
Firm bankrupt in 5 years -0.0020 -0.0021 -0.0022 -0.0019 -0.0018
(0.0035) (0.0035) (0.0036) (0.0035) (0.0035)
Lagged log wealth 0.0112*** 0.0112*** 0.0113*** 0.0112*** 0.0113***
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Home ownership 0.0146*** 0.0146*** 0.0145*** 0.0145*** 0.0146***
(0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0013) (0.0012) (0.0012)
Age 0.0222*** 0.0222*** 0.0241*** 0.0223*** 0.0222***
(0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0013) (0.0017) (0.0017)
Age sq. -0.0001*** -0.0001*** -0.0001*** -0.0001*** -0.0001***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Family size -0.0013* -0.0013* -0.0130*** -0.0013* -0.0013
(0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008)
Unemployment risk -0.0090***
(0.0012)
Hansen J-test p-value 0.13 0.1234 0.1337 0.1286 0.1111
F-stat 1st stage 56.85 56.79 45.98 56.84 56.84
Observations 1,184,800 1,184,800 1,184,800 1,184,800 1,184,800
Notes: The table reports estimates of the marginal e ect of wage and ununemployment risk on the risky financial portfolio share.
Column (1) reproduces the IV benchmark regression of Table 3; column (2) shows the results including a proxy for individual-
specific unemployment risk (the likelihood of separation from a job) estimated separately for high (at least high school) and
low education (less than high school) workers within the firm; column (3) shows the results when weighting the terms in the lag
structure of the equations for ‡2it, FPit and FTit (Section 5.1) using a quadratic mean, where 1.6/(0.1+0.2+0.4+0.8+1.6) is the
weight on the most recent observation. Columns (4) and (5) display the estimates when varying the threshold for risky asset
market participation to 50 and 100 USD, respectively. Regressions also control for family type, area, and year dummies. Hansen
J-test for instrument validity and F-stat for the power of the instruments are shown at the bottom of the table. Clustered
standard errors are in brackets. Coe cient significance: *** at 1 % or less; ** at 5 %; * at 10 %.
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Table 6. Robustness: excluding small firms and ownership in own firm, including household
and secondary jobs earnings
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (5)
Fixed e ect IV (Baseline) and:
Fixed e ect IV restricting firm size: excluding obtaining ‡2it using:
(Baseline) >25th perc. >50th perc. owners HH earnings 2nd job
‡2it -0.4986*** -0.6262*** -0.7558*** -0.5161*** -0.5665*** -0.6116***
(0.1827) (0.2107) (0.2304) (0.1838) (0.2096) (0.2246)
Firm bankrupt in 1 year -0.0201*** -0.0207*** -0.0208*** -0.0201*** -0.0224*** -0.0204***
(0.0066) (0.0067) (0.0071) (0.0067) (0.0069) (0.0067)
Firm bankrupt in 3 years -0.0040 -0.0034 -0.0035 -0.0040 -0.0043 -0.0036
(0.0034) (0.0035) (0.0036) (0.0034) (0.0034) (0.0034)
Firm bankrupt in 5 years -0.0020 -0.0037 -0.0046 -0.0019 -0.0019 -0.0015
(0.0035) (0.0036) (0.0037) (0.0035) (0.0035) (0.0035)
Lagged log wealth 0.0112*** 0.0106*** 0.0102*** 0.0111*** 0.0115*** 0.0112***
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Home ownership 0.0146*** 0.0139*** 0.0122*** 0.0146*** 0.0146*** 0.0146***
(0.0012) (0.0013) (0.0014) (0.0012) (0.0013) (0.0012)
Age 0.0222*** 0.0215*** 0.0200*** 0.0220*** 0.0234*** 0.0222***
(0.0017) (0.0020) (0.0022) (0.0018) (0.0014) (0.0018)
Age sq. -0.0001*** -0.0001*** -0.0001*** -0.0001*** -0.0001*** -0.0001***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Family size -0.0013* -0.0014* -0.0015* -0.0012 -0.0006 -0.0013*
(0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008)
Hansen J-test p-value 0.13 0.19 0.36 0.12 0.14 0.15
F-stat 1st stage 56.85 44.53 38.04 56.09 35.63 44.07
Observations 1,184,800 1,124,682 1,038,205 1,173,031 1,184,800 1,184,800
Notes: The table reports estimates of the marginal e ect of wage and unemployment risk on the risky financial portfolio share.
Column (1) reproduces the IV benchmark regression of Table 3, Column (3); Columns (2) and (3) run the IV estimates on
the sample of large firms, respectively above the 25th percentile (column (2)) and the median size (column (3)). Column (4)
excludes from the sample workers with own-firm stocks; Column (5) measures wage risk with the variance of family earnings;
Columns (6) measures wage risk including also a worker’s secondary job in a given year. Regressions also control for family
type, area, and year dummies. Hansen J-test for instrument validity and F-stat for the power of the instruments are shown at
the bottom of the table. Clustered standard errors are in brackets. Coe cient significance: *** at 1 % or less; ** at 5 %; * at
10 %.
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Table 7. Robustness: including public sector and unemployment spells
(1) (2) (3)
Baseline including:
Fixed e ect IV public sector unemployment
(Baseline) spells spells
‡2it -0.4986*** -0.4754*** -0.3985***
(0.1827) (0.1405) (0.1199)
Firm bankrupt in 1 year -0.0201*** -0.0114** -0.0122**
(0.0066) (0.0056) (0.0052)
Firm bankrupt in 3 years -0.0040 0.0011 0.0018
(0.0034) (0.0030) (0.0028)
Firm bankrupt in 5 years -0.0020 -0.0030 -0.0019
(0.0035) (0.0030) (0.0035)
Lagged log wealth 0.0112*** 0.0107*** 0.0103***
(0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Home ownership 0.0146*** 0.0136*** 0.0136***
(0.0012) (0.0010) (0.0010)
Age 0.0222*** 0.0188*** 0.0171***
(0.0017) (0.0018) (0.0022)
Age sq. -0.0001*** -0.0001*** -0.0001***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Family size -0.0013* -0.0002 0.0001
(0.0008) (0.0006) (0.0006)
Hansen J-test p-value 0.13 0.29 0.21
F-stat 1st stage 56.85 83.18 87.79
Observations 1,184,800 1,673.220 1,778,650
Notes: The table reports estimates of the marginal e ect of wage and unemployment risk on the risky financial portfolio
share. Column (1) reproduces the IV benchmark regression of Table 3; Column (2) includes workers that during the sample
period also have a spell in the public sector; Column (3) includes workers that in a year receives a payroll of less than the
social security basic amount, e ectively including unemployed workers. Regressions also control for family type, area, and year
dummies. Hansen J-test for instrument validity and F-stat for the power of the instruments are shown at the bottom of the
table. Clustered standard errors are in brackets. Coe cient significance: *** at 1 % or less; ** at 5 %; * at 10 %.
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Table 8. Wealth-induced heterogeneity
Panel A: Pass-through regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Permanent value Transitory value Permanent value Transitory value
added shocks added shocks added shocks added shocks
Pass-through 0.0796*** 0.0153*** 0.0232 0.0010
(0.0053) (0.0062) (0.0157) (0.0116)
Pass-through*Lagged log wealth 0.0048*** 0.0012
(0.0012) (0.0010)
Hansen J-test p-value 0.62 0.00 0.63 0.00
F-stat 1st stage 178.91 752.05 107.26 172.64
Observations 1,316,004 1,321,303 1,316,004 1,321,303
Panel B: Risky share regressions
‡2it -2.1392***
(0.7799)
‡2it*Lagged log wealth 0.1379**
(0.0652)
Hansen J-test p-value 0.27
F-stat 1st stage 28.82
Observations 1,184,800
Notes: The table reports estimates of the pass-through coe cients (Panel A) and of the marginal e ect of wage risk on the
risky portfolio share (Panel B) allowing both coe cients to vary with the lagged value of household wealth. Regressions in
Panel B also control for family type, area, and year dummies. Hansen J-test for instrument validity and F-stat for the power of
the instruments are shown at the bottom of the table. Clustered standard errors are in brackets. Coe cient significance: ***
at 1 % or less; ** at 5 %; * at 10 %.
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